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THE THIN FLAT LINE: REDEFNING WHO IS LEGALLY
DEAD IN ORGAN DONATION AFTER CARDIAC DEATH
MAXINE M. HARRINGTONt
Well, it just so happens that your friend here is only mostly dead.
mostly dead and all dead .... Now,
There's a big difference between
1
mostly dead is slightly alive.
INTRODUCTION

By the end of 2008, a pilot program to recover organs from those
dying on the streets of New York City could be in effect. 2 Under a federally-funded grant, the city is proposing to expand the donor pool by
deploying a "rapid organ-recovery ambulance" to procure the organs of
people who die of cardiac arrest outside hospitals. 3 According to newspaper reports, a special transplant ambulance would trail an emergency4
ambulance responding to notification of a victim with cardiac arrest.
After regular paramedics cease resuscitation efforts, the transplant ambulance team would wait five minutes and then attempt to maintain the
viability of organs by administering drugs and by performing chest compressions to the victim until more extensive preservation efforts could be
performed at the hospital and consent for donation from the next of kin
could be obtained.5
Announcement of the program generated considerable controversy.
One commentator referred to the organ-recovery ambulance as a "meat
wagon. ' ' 6 An academic bioethicist pronounced the initiative "disgusting.",7 Another bioethicist voiced her concern that the victims of cardiac
arrest might not be "irreversibly" dead when the organ transplant team
took over minutes after resuscitation efforts ceased.8
Within a few months after the New York City initiative was announced, the New England Journal of Medicine reported that a team of
Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; J.D., The George Washingt
ton University; B.A. University of North Dakota.
I.
THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation 1987).
2. Cara Buckley, City Plans Ambulance for Donor Collections, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, at
A35.
3.
Id.; see also Rob Stein, N.Y Planning Special Ambulance to Recover Organs, WASH.
POST, May 24, 2008, at A01.
4.
Buckley, supranote 2.
5. Stein, supranote 3, at A08.
2008,
May
27,
SLATE,
Wagons,
Meat
Saletan,
6. William
http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/humannature/archive/2008/05/27/meat-wagons.aspx.
7.
Stein, supra note 3 (quoting Michael A. Grodin, director of bioethics at Boston University).
8.
Id. (quoting Leslie M. Whetsine, a bioethicist at Walsh University).
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physicians at Denver Children's Hospital had been able to transplant
hearts from three infant donors who were not brain-dead, but who had
been removed from mechanical life support. 9 Death was declared in one
infant three minutes after cardiac and respiratory efforts ceased; in the
other two infants, death was pronounced after seventy-five seconds of
absent heart and lung functions.' 0 Once death was declared, organ recovery began." Again, some medical bioethicists were alarmed. George
Annas, who has been called the "father of patient rights, 1 2 warned:
"The donors are not dead. I understand they would like us to change the
definition of death, but they can't do that by themselves."', 3 Robert M.
Veatch, professor of medical ethics at Georgetown University, added:
The whole issue is whether the infants from whom the hearts were
taken were dead. It seems very clear to me that they were not .... I
think it's illegal, and if it's illegal, what we're talking about is the
physicians causing the death of the three patients, and
that would be
14
stopped.
be
should
it
think
I
immoral.
It's
homicide.
Should we worry that organs are being removed from people who
are just "mostly" dead? Law and medicine are grappling with a fundamental tension between, on the one hand, delaying the pronouncement of
death until there is no chance of recovery and, on the other hand, increasing the quantity and quality of organs for transplant by pronouncing
death as soon as possible. This article examines whether, in the relentless pursuit of organs, medicine has gone too far in tinkering with the
definition of death.
Most cadaveric organs are recovered from donors who meet brain
death criteria.1 5 There is, however, a growing imbalance between the
number of brain-dead donors and the demand for organs. The New York
City study and the Denver Children's Hospital protocol are recent exam9. Mark M. Boucek et al., Pediatric Heart TransplantationAfter Declarationof Cardiocirculatory Death, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 709, 711, 713 (2008). As an indication of the importance of
this debate, The New England Journal of Medicine also featured three perspective reports, an editorial, and a videotaped roundtable discussion among bioethicists, all of which are available on the
journal's website at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/359/7/669/DCl (last visited Dec. 19,
2008).
10. Boucek et al., supranote 9, at 711.
11.
Id.
12.
Boston University School of Public Health, George Annas, Biography,
http://sph.bu.edu/index.php?option=com-sphdir&id=239&Itemid=340&INDEX=577 (last visited
Dec. 19, 2008).
13.
Rob Stein, Infant Transplant Procedure Ignites Debate; Ethicists Question Strategy in
Which Hearts are Removed Minutes After They Stop Beating, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2008, at AOl
(quoting George J. Annas).
14.
Id. (quoting Robert M. Veatch); see also James L. Bernat, The Boundaries of Organ
DonationAfter Circulatory Death, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 669, 671 (2008) (asserting that the protocol's shortened time period for determining death did not comply with prevailing medical standards).
15.
See Eelco F.M. Wijdicks, The Diagnosis of Brain Death, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1215,
1215-18 (2001) (describing the clinical criteria used to determine brain death, and noting that "brain
death is the principle requisite for the donation of organs for transplantation").
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ples of a movement in the transplant community to increase the supply of
organs by using donors whose heart and lung functions have ceased, but
who are not yet brain dead. This practice, known as donation after car-6
diac death (DCD), has proved controversial for a number of reasons.
This article addresses the threshold controversy: whether DCD donors
are legally dead at the time organ procurement begins.
The Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA) and its state
counterparts require the "irreversible" cessation of the functions of either
(1) the entire brain or (2) the heart and lungs before a person can be considered dead.1 7 There is a significant debate among scholars over whether
the UDDA recognizes two kinds of death or only two different criteria,
cardiac and neurological, under a unitary concept of death.' 8 The proponents of DCD have resolved this controversy by recognizing donation
after "cardiac death," where organs can be removed minutes after the
heart stops, before brain death occurs.' 9 Locating a precise moment of
death is not an issue in most victims of cardiac arrest. It is a primary
issue in DCD, however, because once the heart stops, there is a need to
protect transplantable organs from deteriorating due to a lack of blood
flow. 20 The quality of organs is less of a concern with patients who are
declared dead under brain death criteria because the donor is maintained
on artificial support after death to keep the heart and lungs functioning
throughout organ procurement. 2' The DCD donor is not declared dead
until life support is withdrawn or unsuccessful resuscitation is termi22
ensuring
between
a conflict
createsorgans
organs
forisviable
The need
23
nated.
as possible.
as soon
removing
dead and
patient
that the donor
As DCD is generally practiced in the United States, death is declared two to five minutes after the cessation of cardiac and respiratory
functions. 24 Once a diagnosis of cardiac death is made, transplant surgeConcerns have also been raised about the pre-mortem administration of drugs and preser16.
vation of organs in the dying or newly dead donor; see Sarah D. Barber, The Tell-Tale Heart: Ethical and Legal Implications of ln Situ Organ Preservationin the Non-Heart-BeatingCadaver Donor,
6 HEALTH MATRix 471, 473,487-89 (1996); see also infra note 111.
17.
UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 589 (1980); see also discussion
infra Part Ill.
Alexander M. Capron, Brain Death-Well Settled Yet Still Unresolved, 344 NEW ENG. J.
18.
MED. 1244, 1245 (2001).
Robert Steinbrook, Organ Donation After Cardiac Death, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 209,
19.
209 (2007).
20.
INST. OF MED., NON-HEARTING-BEATING ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: PRACTICE AND
PROTOCOLS 22 (2000), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid=9700 [hereinafter
2000 IOM Report].
George J. Annas, Brain Death and Organ Donation: You Can Have One Without the
21.
Other, 18 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 28, 28 (1988).
22.
Robert D. Truog & Franklin Miller, The Dead Donor Rule and Organ Transplantation,
359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 674, 674 (2008).
2000 IOM Report, supra note 20 (noting that the "need to maintain organ viability creates
23.
a strong incentive for an early determination of death").
See James L. Bemat et al., Report of a National Conference on Donation After Cardiac
24.
Death, 6 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 281, 282 (2006) (stating that most organ procurement organiza-
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ons begin the process of organ retrieval. It is unlikely that the DCD donor satisfies the criteria for brain death at the time of organ procurement
as it takes longer than five minutes for the entire brain to be irreversibly
damaged from lack of oxygen.25 The speed with which a diagnosis of
death is made in the DCD context is done solely to facilitate organ procurement. 26 The closer the donor is to life, the more useful the organs
will be to the recipient.
The debate over whether DCD donors are truly dead is not new but
has surfaced mostly in the academic community. Recently, however,
DCD has become a focus of media and public attention, as demonstrated
by the debate over the New York City and Denver Children's Hospital
initiatives. In addition, the Washington Post featured an article in March
2007 about a "new trend in organ donation," airing the concerns of some
physicians and bioethicists about the controversial practice of donation
after cardiac death.2 7 In 2008, widespread publicity was given to the
indictment of a transplant surgeon in California in connection with the
alleged administration of excessive and inappropriate medications to a
potential donor awaiting cardiac death after removal from a ventilator.28
These reports in the lay press mirror the expanding use of DCD to
boost the supply of organs. Although the number of organs transplanted
from cardiac death donors is still relatively small, 29 an increase is expected as hospitals and organ procurement organizations begin to develop DCD policies under mandate from oversight bodies.3 ° Currently,
most DCD donors are severely ill, hospitalized patients who do not meet
the criteria for brain death but who have decided, either personally or
through a surrogate, to refuse resuscitation and to withdraw lifesustaining medical care.3 ' The controversy over whether patients are
tions use a five minute interval, while three use an interval of two minutes and one uses four minutes). Pediatric DCD is relatively new, and with two donors, Denver Children's Hospital waited
only seventy-five seconds after death to begin organ retrieval. See Boucek et al., supra note 9, at
711 and accompanying text.
25. See Barber, supra note 16, at 471-72 (defining brain death); see also infra notes 211-12
and accompanying text.
26. Rob Stein, New Trend in Organ Donation Raises Questions, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2007,
at A03.
27. Id.
28. See Jesse McKinley, Surgeon Is Accused of Hurrying Death of Patient to Get Organs,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, at Al (reporting that transplant physician ordered excessive doses of
morphine and Ativan and administered Betadine, a topical antiseptic, through a nasogastric tube).
The physician was acquitted of all charges in December 2008, although the jury issued a note with
its verdict stating that the case illustrated a need for clear standards in cardiac death donation. Jesse
McKinley, Surgeon Clearedof Harming Man to Rush Organ Removal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008,
at A20.
29.
In 2006, DCD organs comprised eight percent of the total cadaveric organs transplanted.
HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVS. ADMIN., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. ORGAN
PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK AND THE SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT
RECIPIENTS:
TRANSPLANT
DATA
1997-2006
Table
1.1
(2007),
available
at

http://www.optn.org/AR2007/11ldh.pdf [hereinafter 2007 OPTN/SRTR ANNUAL REPORT].
30.
See infra notes 145-147 and accompanying text.
31.

Steinbrook, supra note 19, at 209-10.
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"dead enough" for organ procurement has focused almost exclusively on
this subset of potential donors, and little attention has been given to the
distinct medical and legal concerns presented by the expansion of DCD
to victims of sudden cardiac arrest outside the hospital. There is an obvious conflict between the right of these individuals to adequate emergency resuscitative efforts and the need to procure organs only minutes
after cessation of the heartbeat. Removing organs a mere seventy-five
seconds after the heart stops and transplanting hearts from donors who
are not brain dead are two other recent developments in DCD that test
the legal and ethical boundaries of organ transplantation. These controversial practices raise fundamental questions about the extent to which
society is willing to tolerate the removal of vital organs from people we
cannot be certain are dead in order to satisfy the escalating demand for
organs. This article suggests that there is a need for a wider public debate on the permissible limits of DCD, but that a reasonable accommodation can be reached without compromising legal standards for determining death. There are ethically defensible reasons to allow this form of
organ procurement in hospitalized patients voluntarily removed from life
support, but absent broad social and political consensus, DCD, as currently practiced, should not be expanded to other potential donors.
Part I of this article begins with a brief background of solid organ
transplantation and the statutory framework in which it operates. Part II
explains the practice of donation after cardiac death and the history of its
use in the United States. Part 1I examines whether DCD donors are legally dead under the UDDA. In Part IV, the article explores whether it is
appropriate, given the speed with which death is determined, to apply
DCD as it is currently practiced to those in sudden cardiac arrest or to
children. Part V addresses the concern that DCD is causing the death of
donors. Part VI suggests several approaches to resolve the controversy
over the determination of death in DCD donors. This article concludes
with a call for this debate to move beyond scholarly journals into the
public arena.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOLID ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION AND THE
LEGAL RESPONSE

The first successful human transplant was performed in 1954 when
Dr. Joseph Murray transplanted a kidney from a live donor into his identical twin brother.32 Eight years later, Dr. Murray performed the first
transplant from a cadaveric donor.33 Early cadaveric transplants, primarily kidneys, were from patients who had suffered traditional circulatory death, where the lungs and heart ceased functioning. 34 Survival
Peter I. Abt et al., DonationAfter CardiacDeath in the US: History and Use, 203 J. AM.
32.
COLL. SURGEONS 208, 209 (2006).
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
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rates of recipients were poor, however, primarily due to problems with
rejection and poor organ quality caused by warm ischemia time, 35 the
period in which the36donor's organs begin to die from lack of an oxygenated blood supply.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the use of neurological criteria to define death, which eventually came to be known as brain death, began to
develop.3 7 In 1959, French neurophysiologists coined the term, le coma
depasse, or irreversible coma, to describe patients with irreparable brain
damage. 38 By the mid-1960s, medical technology had progressed to the
point where it was possible to keep patients with devastating neurological injuries alive. 39 In many of these cases, medical tests, including the
electroencephalogram (EEG) demonstrated irreversible cessation of brain
activity. 40 Some patients developed what is known as respirator brain, a
condition where the heart and lungs can be kept functioning through mechanical ventilation, but where the brain tissue shows extensive signs of
cell death.41
The burgeoning transplant community understood the implications
of being able to recover organs that were still perfusing, or receiving a
blood supply, through artificial support while the person was brain
dead. 42 Recovering organs from a "heart-beating donor" would avoid the
problem of warm ischemia time associated with circulatory death, which
diminishes the quality of organs available for transplantation.43 In other
words, the donor's brain would be dead, but the transplantable organs
still very much alive.
There was a perceived legal impediment to the removal of organs
from those who had suffered brain death, however. State laws were silent or unsettled on the new phenomenon of neurological death. 44 The

35. Warm ischemia time refers to the time in which the heart and lungs are not functioning
adequately to ensure the flow of blood to the organs. Without blood, oxygen cannot be delivered
and vital organs will die. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at xv.
36. Abt et al., supra note 32, at 212.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 213.
41.
PRESIDENT'S COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: A REPORT ON THE MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL
ISSUES
IN
THE
DETERMINATION
OF
DEATH
23
(1981),
available
at

http:lwww.bioethics.gov/reports/past-commissions/defining-death.pdf

[hereinafter

DEFINING

DEATH].

42.
Id. (stating that there was a "new urgency" in the transplant community to recognize brain
death).
43.
See N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Sulsona, 367 N.Y.S.2d 686, 689 (Sup. Ct. 1975)
(noting agreement of experts that kidneys obtained from donors who died from cardiopulmonary
death resulted in an eighty-eight percent incidence of renal failure in the recipient, while kidneys
from those who were brain dead were indistinguishable from those obtained from living donors).
44.
See id. at 689-91 (addressing a petition for declaratory judgment that New York's definition of death included neurological death).
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common law defined death as cardiac and respiratory failure. 45 Transplant surgeons who attempted to remove organs from persons who were
brain dead but who still had heart and lung function, albeit mechanically,
46
were concerned with possible criminal prosecution or civil suits.
In 1968, the landmark work of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School was published, which proposed irreversible coma as
a new criterion for determining death. 47 The committee stated that its
purpose was two-fold: to decrease the burden on families of keeping a
person on continued medical support who had irreversible brain damage,
and to facilitate the recovery of organs from such people because they
were dead, not under traditional circulatory criteria, but under the new
definition of brain death. 48 According to the Ad Hoc Committee,
"[o]bsolete criteria for the definition of death can lead to controversy in
obtaining organs for transplantation.,, 49 The Ad Hoc Committee's findings were quickly and widely accepted by the medical community. In
1970, Kansas adopted the first statute to formulate a legal definition of
death to include brain death, as well as circulatory death. 50 Other states
quickly followed suit and, by 1980, twenty-four states had enacted statutory definitions of death that incorporated brain death. 5'
Due to the failure of some states to enact brain death legislation and
the lack of uniformity in existing state laws, in 1980 Congress convened
an interdisciplinary body under the auspices of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research (President's Commission) to explore the advisability of developing a uniform definition of death.52 In 1981, the President's
Commission recommended adoption of the Uniform Determination of
Death Act (UDDA).53 The UDDA provides:

Id. at 689; Lovato v. Dist. Court Tenth Judicial Dist., 601 P.2d 1072, 1076 (Colo. 1979).
45.
46.
See Sulsona, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (noting that one of the reasons the petitioner sought
court approval of a new definition of death was the fear of potential criminal or civil liability); see
also Alexander Morgan Capron & Leon R. Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standardsfor Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87, 97-100 (1972) (discuss-

ing the need for a statutory definition of neurological death to allay professionals' fears of civil and
criminal litigation).
47.

AD Hoc COMMITTEE OF THE HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL TO EXAMINE THE DEFINITION

OF BRAIN DEATH, A DEFINITION OF IRREVERSIBLE COMA, 205 JAMA 85, 85 (1968) [hereinafter Ad
Hoc Committee]. The report uses the terms irreversible coma and brain death coextensively. Id. at
88. Later, the medical community would recognize that these diagnoses are not interchangeable.
See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 25.
Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 47, at 85.
48.
49.
Id.
50. Capron & Kass, supra note 46, at 108-09.
51.

RICHARD M. ZANER, DEATH: BEYOND WHOLE-BRAIN CRITERIA 2 (Richard M. Zaner ed.,

Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988).
52. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 1,7-8; see also supra at 24-25 (the Commission stated
that it was also necessary to clarify the "misleading" term, irreversible coma, used by the Ad Hoc
Committee in its 1968 report).
53.

DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41.
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An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of
all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A
determination of death
must be made in accordance with accepted
54
medical standards.

The President's Commission was aware of the impact its recommendations would have on the burgeoning field of organ transplantation.
If the UDDA were widely adopted, neurologically devastated patients
with functioning hearts and lungs could be declared dead in every jurisdiction.55 The Commission's hopes were soon realized. The UDDA or
similar legislation was approved in almost every state, although the statutes are not entirely "uniform" in their definitions of death. 56 Legal recognition of brain death led to the almost universal abandonment of organ
procurement from persons suffering a traditional death following cardiac
arrest.57 Because mechanical ventilation sustained the vital functions of
the heart and lungs, the quality of organs recovered from brain-dead,
heart-beating donors was vastly superior to organs impaired by the warm
ischemia time associated with circulatory death.5 8
To promote organ donation, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA) was adopted in 1968, and subsequently revised in 1987 and
2006. 59 This act encourages cadaveric organ transplantation by authorizing the donation of an organ by an adult effective at death and by the
next of kin after death.60 The UAGA also immunizes physicians recovering organs in good faith from civil and criminal prosecution. 6 1 Every
state has adopted one of the versions of the UAGA.62
As a mechanism for organizing organ donations and transplantation,
the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) was passed in 1984.63
NOTA established the Organ Procurement Transplantation Network
(OPTN), which is charged with maintaining a waiting list of individuals
54.

UN1F. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 1, 12A U.L.A. 781 (2008).

55. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 7-8 (asserting that state variations in the definition of
death are not acceptable).
56. See generally Jason L. Goldsmith, Wanted! Deadand/orAlive: ChoosingAmong the NotSo-Uniform Statutory Definitions of Death, 61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 871, 889-90 (2007) (noting differences in the language of state law definitions of death).
57. See Abt et al., supra note 32, at 213-14 (noting that after the recognition of brain death,
almost every transplant center stopped retrieving organs from DCD patients); Michael A. DeVita, et
al., Observations of Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment from Patients Who Became NonHeart-Beating Organ Donors, 28 CRrrICAL CARE MED. 1709, 1709 (2000) (stating that non-heartbeating donation was largely abandoned when it was found that organs from brain-dead donors had
better survival).
58. See Abt et al., supra note 32, at 214.
59. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 1-11 (amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 27, 19 (Supp. 2008).
60. Id. §§ 4,9.
61.
Id. § 18.
62. Joseph B. Clamon, Tax Policy as a Lifeline: Encouraging Blood and Organ Donation
Through Tax Credits, 17 ANNALS HEALTH L. 67, 76 (2008) (stating that the UAGA has been
adopted in one of its forms by all fifty states).
63. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 273-274g (2008).
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who need organs, matching potential recipients with organs, operating a
system for procuring and allocating organs, and increasing the supply of
organs. 64 In 1986, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) received the first (and only) federal contract to operate the OPTN and to
coordinate the placement of organs and the collection of data on donor
and transplant recipients. 65 The OPTN also includes a system of regional
Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) that are responsible for procuring,66 testing, and distributing organs within their respective geographic
areas.
II. THE RENEWED INTEREST IN DONATION AFTER CARDIAC DEATH

The clinical field of transplantation was spurred not only by the
shift in recovery of better quality organs from brain-dead, heart-beating
donors, but also by improved techniques for preserving organs after their
removal and by the use of immunosuppressants to prevent organ rejection in recipients. 67 In particular, the discovery of cyclosporine in 1978
is thought to have revolutionized the field of68transplantation by markedly
improving survival rates in organ recipients.
By the end of the twentieth century, solid organ transplantation had
become the standard of care for treating organ failure, with recipients
living longer with better quality of life than that offered by conventional
treatments. 69 For example, numerous studies demonstrate that with endstage renal failure, patients who receive kidney transplants have significantly higher long-term survival rates compared to those who remain on
dialysis.7 °
71
With imYet transplantation is "a victim of its own success.,,
provement in the lives of recipients, the demand for transplants has far
outstripped the supply. Even if all brain-dead patients were suitable donors, the number of organs recovered could not meet the needs of all the
patients on the transplant waiting list.7 2 In 1997, there were a total of
9,539 donors; by 2006, that number had increased to 14,756, of which
8,024 were cadaveric donors and 6,732 were living donors.73 During the
64.
Id. § 274(b)(2).
United Network for Organ Sharing: Organ Donation and Transplantation, History of the
65.
UNOS Database, http://www.unos.org/data/about/history.asp (last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
66.
42 U.S.C. §273(b)(3).
Abt et al., supra note 32, at 214.
67.
68.
Id. at 208, 214.
Id. at 214.
69.
See, e.g., J.E. Locke et al., Outcomes of Kidneys from Donors After Cardiac Death:
70.
Implicationsfor Allocation and Preservation,7 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1797, 1803 (2007) (noting a sixty-eight percent reduction in the long-term mortality of transplanted patients over those on
dialysis).
71.
Mark D. Fox, Stewards of a Public Trust: Responsible Transplantation, 3 AM. J.
BIOETHICS v, vi (2003).
Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the United
72.
States, 349 N. ENG. J. MED. 667, 673 (2003).
2007 OPTN/SRTR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at Table 1.1.
73.
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same period, however, the waiting list 74 increased by more than 40,000:
from 55,501 in 1997 to 98,263 in 2006. 75
In response to the growing imbalance between supply and demand,
there has been a surge of new initiatives to increase the donor pool. The
National Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative was established in
2003 to develop best practices for hospitals in order to achieve organ
donation rates of seventy-five percent, up from an average of forty-three
76
percent. Medicare conditions of participation require each hospital to
notify its OPO of all patient deaths and imminent deaths so that the OPO
has the opportunity to determine the suitability of potential organ donors. 77 The deceased donor pool has been expanded through the use of
"marginal" organs, so that older donors or those with an underlying disease are being increasingly used to fill the need for cadaveric organs.78
The use of living donors, primarily for kidneys, increased by seventy
percent from 1997 through 2004, but has fallen slightly in the last several
years. 79 Despite current law prohibiting the sale of organs, 80 there have
been proposals to financially incentivize donors, either through payments
to the donor before death or the family after death, although none of
these controversial recommendations has been implemented. 8' Xenotransplantation, the transplantation of organs from non-humans to humans, is in the experimental stage but its use is severely limited by unknown health risks and ethical questions.82
Finally, pressure to increase the supply of organs caused the transplant community to re-examine organ retrieval from patients who were
not brain-dead but whose circulatory functions had stopped.8 3 By the
end of the twentieth century, the once seemingly insurmountable problems associated with warm ischemia time and the rapid deterioration of
74.
2007 OPTN/SRTR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at Chapter I (noting that some patients may be listed on multiple waiting lists, and the total number of registrations is higher than the
number of unique patients); id. (stating that thirty percent of those on the waiting list are deemed
"inactive" because they are not immediately eligible for an organ if one becomes available); see also
Rob Stein, A Third of Patients on TransplantList Are Not Eligible, WASH. POST. Mar. 22, 2008, at
AO1 (questioning the reliability of the waiting list numbers).
75.
2007 OPTN/SRTR ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 29, at Table 1.3.
76.
See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN.
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROGRAMS, Div. OF TRANSPLANTATION No. 240-94-0037, THE ORGAN
DONATION BREAKTHROUGH COLLABORATIVE: BEST PRACTICES FINAL REPORT (2003), available at
http://www.njha.com/onit/pdf/930200530512PM71 .pdf.

77.
42 C.F.R. § 482.45(a)(1) (2003).
78.
Craig R. Smith & Jeffrey A. Lowell, Ethical Considerations in Organ Donation and
Transplantation, 15 J. INTENSIVE CARE MED. 231, 235 (2000).
79.
2007 OPTN/SRTR Annual Report, supra note 29, at Table 1.1.
80.
National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C § 274e (2008).
81.
See generally Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 108-118 (2004) (summarizing financial initiatives
to increase organ donation).

82.

See generally Margaret A. Clark, This Little Piggy Went to Market: The Xenotransplanta-

tion and Xenozoonose Debate, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 137, 138-145 (1999) (discussing the medical,

ethical, and legal issues raised by xenotrasplantation).
83.
Abt et al., supra note 32, at 214.
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organs after cardiac arrest were being alleviated with improved donor
preparation and organ preservation methods. 84 These donors were originally referred to as non-heart-beating donors (NHBDs), in contrast to the
heart-beating donors who suffered brain death. 85 Donation from a nonheart-beating donor is now termed donation after cardiac death (DCD)
and that term is used throughout this article to provide a consistent terminology.8 6
Legal developments in end-of-life care also spurred renewed interest in DCD. In 1968, at the time of the Ad Hoc Committee's recognition
of brain death, physicians were urged not to remove respirators before a
declaration of death was made as this could subject them to legal jeopardy. 87 Beginning with the Quinlan case in 1976,88 through Cruzan in
1990,89 the "right to die" debate had evolved from a nascent movement
to widespread acceptance of a patient's right to withdraw life-sustaining
technology. Patients who were terminally ill but not brain-dead and who
requested or had their surrogates request removal of extraordinary care
were now a potential source of organs. 90
Organ donors who die from cardiac death rather than brain death are
categorized as either controlled or uncontrolled donors. 9 1 In the controlled group are those who are neurologically damaged or severely ill,
usually on a ventilator, and who have a planned withdrawal from lifesustaining treatment because of the futility of further care. 92 The uncon84.
Id.
85. Id.
86.
One critic has alleged that the terminology was changed from NHBD to DCD as a marketing ploy in the face of uncertainty in determining death. Mohammed Y. Rady et al., Non-Heart
Beating, or Cardiac Death, Organ Donation: Why We Should Care, 2 J. HOSP. MED. 324, 328
(2007). The Institute of Medicine has suggested that the terminology be further refined to donation
after circulatory determination of death (DCDD). COMMITTEE ON INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN
DONATION, ORGAN DONATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 128 (James F. Childress & Catharyn T.
Liverman, eds., 2006), available at http://www.iom.edu/CMS/3740/24738/34249.aspx [hereinafter
2006 IOM REPORT].

87.
Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 47, at 339.
In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jer88.
sey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (holding that a patient has a constitutional right of privacy to terminate lifesustaining treatment).
89. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (assuming that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment).
90.
ROGER HERDMAN & JOHN T. POTIS, DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, NON-HEART-BEATING ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION MEDICAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN

PROCUREMENT 24 (1997), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid=6036 [hereinafter
1997 IOM REPORT].

Id. at 1. These categories are derived from the classification of non-heart-beating donors
91.
developed at the University Hospital Maastricht in the Netherlands. Id. at 25. The Maastricht categories include: 1. Dead on arrival; 2. Unsuccessful resuscitation; 3. Awaiting cardiac arrest; and 4.
Cardiac arrest while brain dead. G. Koostra et al., Categories of Non-Heart-Beating Donors, 27
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2883, 2883 (1995). Category three is controlled; the other categories are
uncontrolled. Id. at 2893-94. A fifth uncontrolled donor category, unexpected cardiac arrest in a
critically ill patient, was recently added. Dale Gardiner et al., Editorial, Non-Heart-Beating Donation-Solution or a Step Too Far?,62 ANESTHESIA 431, 431 (2007).
92.

1997 IOM REPORT, supra note 90, at I.
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trolled donor includes those who experience an out-of-hospital cardiac
arrest or who are hospitalized and suffer an unexpected cardiac arrest and
are not successfully resuscitated.9 3
Most DCD donors are in the controlled group, where the timing of
cardiac arrest and the retrieval of organs are carefully planned events and
provide transplant surgeons with the shortest time for the retrieval of
viable organs. 94 To approach the success rates of transplantation with
organs from brain-dead, heart-beating donors requires a short interval to
death and a prompt declaration of death followed by rapid organ retrieval
and cold preservation of the organs.95 With the consent of the patient or
patient's family, physicians remove the ventilator and other life support
in or near an operating room, waiting for the pulse and respirations to
cease. 96 Once that occurs, death is declared quickly, usually within two
to five minutes, and the organ procurement process immediately begins. 97 Occasionally, circulation does not promptly cease after life support has been withdrawn.9 8 If cardiopulmonary arrest does not occur
within a short period of time after removal of the ventilator, organ quality diminishes. 99 Most DCD protocols provide that if death does not occur within one hour, organ recovery will not be carried out.' ° In that
event, the patient is returned to a patient care unit to await death.10 1
In the United States, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
was one of the first to revisit the non-heart-beating donor as a possible
source of organs. In 1992, the transplant center produced a protocol for
recovering organs from persons who were not brain dead but who were
expected to die from cardiac arrest following the voluntary withdrawal of
life support. 10 2 A central piece of this policy (commonly known as the
"Pittsburgh protocol") was that procurement of organs could not begin
until the donor suffered irreversible cessation of cardiopulmonary function, which required an observation time of two minutes following cardiac arrest before
the declaration of death could be made and the retrieval
03
begun.'
process
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 24.
95.
Id. at 26.
96.
DeVita et al., supra note 57, at 1710 (describing the process of organ procurement at the
University of Pittsburg Medical Center).
97.
Id.
98.
2000 IOM REPORT, supra note 20, at 21.
99.
Id.
100. Id.
101.
Id.
102.
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Policy and Procedure Manual, Subject: Management of Terminally I Patients Who May become Organ Donors After Death, reprinted in
PROCURING ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT, THE DEBATE OVER NON-HEART BEATING CADAVER

PROTOCOLS, app. at 235 (Robert M. Arnold et al., eds., 1995) [hereinafter PROCURING ORGANS FOR
TRANSPLANT].
103.
Id. at 240. Clinical tests to confirm death included pulselessness, apnea, and electrocardiographic criteria. Id.
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Concerns in the medical community about the two-minute length of
time between cessation of circulatory functions and the declaration of
death were promptly raised. An entire issue of the Kennedy Institute of
Ethics Journal was devoted to the controversies surrounding the Pittsburg
protocol. 1°4 Ren6e Fox, who was a member of the President's Commission, called the plan macabre and an "ignoble form of cannibalism."' 5
The primary concern, which persists to this day, is that the period of time
between the cessation of circulation and the declaration of death is too
short to be certain the patient is irreversibly dead before organs are harvested.
Following the lead of the Pittsburgh Medical Center, the Cleveland
Clinic developed a similar proposal for recovering organs from DCD
donors.' 0 6 However, a professor of bioethics at Cleveland State University went to the local county prosecutor, alleging that under the draft
protocol, the Clinic intended to hasten patients' deaths in order to procure their organs for transplant) 0 7 In March 1997, Sixty Minutes, a national television show, aired a segment in which it claimed that patients
at the Cleveland Clinic were being killed for their organs.' 0 8 Calling it a
"matter of grave concern," the assistant district attorney commenced an
investigation into the organ procurement policy. 1°9 The protocol was not
implemented.110
In response to concerns about DCD, the Institute of Medicine
(IOM) was asked by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
in 1997 to review the medical and ethical issues associated with nonheart-beating donation.' In its report, the IOM acknowledged the "relentlessly increasing need for organs for patients with life-threatening
organ failures .... 12 The number of DCD donors was a very small
component of the cadaveric donors: in 1996 there were only sixty-five
DCD donors out of 5,416 dead donors." 3 The majority of OPOs recov-

104.

3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 103 (1993). The articles in this issue were later published in

PROCURING ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT, supra note 102.

105.

Ren6e Fox, "An Ignoble Form of Cannibalism": Reflections on the Pittsburgh Protocol

for Procuring Organs from Non-Heart-Beating Cadavers, in
TRANSPLANT, supra note 102, at 155, 162.

PROCURING

ORGANS

FOR

106.
George J. Agich, From Pittsburgh to Cleveland: NHBD Controversiesand Bioethics, 8
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 269, 269 (1999).
107.
Id.; see also Gina Kolata, Controversy Erupts over Organ Removals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
13, 1997, at A28.

108.

Agich, supra note 106, at 269.

109.
Kolata, supra note 107.
110.
James M. DuBois & Michael DeVita, DonationAfter CardiacDeath in the United States:
How to Move Forward, 34 CRITICAL CARE MED. 3045, 3045 (2006) (stating that the Cleveland

Clinic DCD protocol was never implemented).
111.
1997 IOM REPORT, supra note 90, App. A. In addition to the criteria for determining
death, the IOM discussed ethical issues involving DCD policies and oversight, pre-and post-mortem

medical interventions, conflicts of interest, and interaction with families. Id. at 47-57, 61-63.
112.
113.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 10, 27, Table 4.1A.
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ered no organs from DCD donors.1 14 Citing the more than 50,000 people
on the waiting list, the IOM concluded it was unlikely that in the future,
brain-dead donors or living donors would be able to satisfy the increasing demand.' 15 Returning to DCD donors as a source of organs was one
way the transplant community could address the shortage of organs. A
study cited by the IOM predicted that use of controlled
donors could
6
increase cadaver donors by at least twenty-five percent. 1
In 1997, there were twenty-nine OPOs (out of sixty-three) that had a
written DCD protocol." 7 The standards for determining the irreversibility of cardiopulmonary death varied considerably: several protocols required very specific criteria such as confirmation of a zero pulse, apnea, t1 8 unresponsiveness to verbal stimuli, and absence of electrical activity for two minutes on the electrocardiogram (ECG)." 9 Others were
vague as to the criteria for determining death.120 Although prominent
European programs required a ten minute cessation of cardiopulmonary
function before organ procurement,' 2' U.S. guidelines were either silent
or varied significantly with respect to the period of time organ retrieval
could begin after heart stoppage. Some allowed organ retrieval immediately after cardiac arrest, while others22mandated a waiting period ranging from sixty seconds to five minutes.
While voicing its support for increasing the supply of organs from
this patient population, the IOM suggested that DCD policies as to the
timing and criteria for determining death be uniform among OPOs and
hospitals. 23 The IOM noted the difficulties surrounding the timing of
events and the requirement of "irreversible" cardiac death. 124 A lack of
adequate safeguards in declaring death could leave transplant programs
open to charges of orchestrating a premature death and retrieval of organs. 125 The IOM recommended a waiting period of at least five minutes
after the cessation of heart and lung activity as demonstrated by ECG
114.
Id. at 31.
115.
Id. at 14. At the end of 1996, there were 50,047 people on the transplantation waiting list.
Id. at 11. During the same year, there were 8,940 donors, of which 5,416 were dead donors and
3,524 were living donors. Id. at 10.
116.
Id. at 30.
117.
Id. at 34-35.
118.
Apnea is the absence of breathing. STEDMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY 118 (28th ed. 2006).
119.
1997 1DM Report, supra note 90, at 40.
120.
Id.
121.
Id. at 58; see R. Schlumpf, et al., Transplantationof Kidneys from Non-Heart-Beating
Donors: Protocol, CardiacDeath Diagnosis, and Results, 28 TRANSPLANTATION PRoc. 107, 107
(1996) (stating that protocol of University of Zurich Hospital is to wait ten minutes after the diagnosis of cardiac death before further organ retrieval procedures are implemented); G. Koostra, Statement on Non-Heart-Beating Donor Programs, 27 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2965, 2965 (1995)
(reporting that the first international workshop on non-heart-beating protocols reached consensus on
a ten-minute interval after cardiac arrest to ensure the dead donor rule).
122.
1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 40-41.
123.
Id. at 48.
124.
Id. at 57.
125.
Id.
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changes consistent with absent heart function and zero pulse activity as
monitored by an arterial catheter before a declaration of death is made
and organ retrieval commences. 126 A two-minute or shorter interval from
cardiopulmonary cessation to declaration of death was deemed by the
IOM as too short to ensure irreversibility. 127 The IOM's recommendation for a five-minute interval applied solely to controlled donors who
decline resuscitation after the withdrawal of life support; no suggestions
were made as to the appropriate waiting period for uncontrolled donors,
who, as 8the IOM noted, present a different set of ethical and legal chal12
lenges.
Despite the IOM's imprimatur and the growing demand for organs,
over the next few years the process of harvesting organs from non-heartbeating donors failed to gain wide acceptance. 29 In an effort to promote
DCD and to overcome obstacles to its implementation, the IOM issued a
follow-up report in 2000, encouraging the development of DCD protocols. 130 No new ground was broken by this report. The IOM reiterated
its original proposal for consistency among DCD protocols in the determination of death,131 although it appeared to retreat from its 1997 report
recommending a five minute interval from cardiopulmonary function
until a declaration of death. In its 2000 report, the IOM recognized that
"well considered" opinions may differ on the proper interval and that a
32
two-minute wait was acceptable.1
Progress on DCD continued slowly. By 2003, out of sixty-nine
OPOs, twenty-five performed no DCD retrieval, and only eight OPOs
recovered organs from ten or more donors, which accounted for sixtyeight percent of all DCD donations in the United States. 33 In 2005, a
national conference of experts ("consensus conference") was convened
to assess the medical and ethical issues surrounding DCD. 134 The participants concluded that DCD was ethically acceptable and encouraged
greater use of such protocols to increase the number of organs available
for transplantation. 135 The consensus conference also found a short waiting period acceptable: a period of at least two minutes but not longer
than five minutes should lapse between asystole,136or the lack of a heart126. Id. at 59, 61.
127. Id. at 59.
128.
Id. at 5, 50; see also infra discussion Part V.A.
129. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 9 (stating that less than three percent of donors were
NHBDs and that there were only about a dozen active NHBD programs); see also DeVita, et al.,
supra note 57, at 1711 (noting the lack of support for non-heart-beating donation).
130. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 2.
131.
Id.
at 39.
132. Id.
133. Richard J, Howard, A JO-Year Analysis of Organ Donation After Cardiac Death in the
United States, 80 TRANSPLANTATION 564, 565 (2005).

134. Bernat et al., supra note 24, at 281
135. Id. at 287.
136. Asystole is defined as the absence of heart contractions. STEDMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY,
supra note 118, at 172.
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beat, and recovery of organs.137 Interestingly, rejecting the IOM's recommendation, the conference decided that it was not necessary to confirm loss of circulatory functions by electronic monitoring.' 38 Thus, a
person could be declared dead while still demonstrating cardiac electrical
activity on an ECG.
In spite of its efforts, the IOM recognized that in 2006, there was
still "general inertia" in implementing DCD.139 Noting that DCD remained controversial, the IOM stated: "this committee believes that it is
worth examining why three IOM committees and at least two international consensus conferences have all concluded that both controlled and
uncontrolled [DCD] can proceed
in an ethical manner yet so little has
140
practice."'
clinical
in
changed
One of the reasons for the lagging interest in DCD has been clinical
resistance.' 14 A survey published in 2006 revealed that bedside caregivers had numerous concerns about DCD. 142 Among the reservations listed
by healthcare providers at all professional
levels was a perceived similar' 43
ity between DCD and "euthanasia."'
The lack of support for DCD may soon change. Following the efforts of the IOM and transplant community to encourage greater use of
DCD, the Joint Commission, which accredits ninety-one percent of the
nation's hospitals, 44 implemented a new standard, effective January
2007, requiring hospitals to develop policies addressing the recovery of
organs from asystolic donors. 145 The Joint Commission does not require
hospitals to provide DCD, but if the hospital and its medical staff do not
wish to implement a DCD protocol, the hospital must justify its reasons
in writing.146 Finally, UNOS developed model elements for a DCD poli-

137.
Bemat et al., supra note 24, at 282.
138.
Id.
139.
2006 IOM Report, supranote 86, at 136.
140.
Id. at 144.
141.
See M. Susan Mandell et al., National Evaluation of Healthcare ProviderAttitudes Toward Organ Donation After CardiacDeath, 34 CRITICAL CARE MED. 2952, 2952 (2006).
142.
Id. at 2955.
143.
Id. The term euthanasia was not defined, and could mean either active or passive euthanasia.
144.
JOINT COMM'N, JOINT COMMISSION FACT SHEETS, FACTS ABouT JOINT COMMISSION
ACCREDITATION AND CERTIFICATION, http:/www.jointcommission.orglAboutUslFactSheets/

facts-jc-acrr-cert.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2008).
145.
See JOINT COMM'N. OF ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., THE JOINT
COMMISSION. HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION PROGRAM: HOSPITAL TRANSPLANT SAFETY, STANDARD

TS.01.01.01, 2 (2008), availableat http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/E9943504-BFF542B1-9467-79FECID9BD66/0/HAPTS.pdf. The provision was previously designated as a part of
Standard LD 3.110. See Joint Conm'n. on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., Approved: Revisions
to Standard LD.3.110, 26 JOINT COMM'N
PERSPS.
7
(2006), available at
www.sharenj.org/hospital%20professionals/pdf/JCAHO%20Standard%20LD%203%201 10.pdf.
146.
JOINT COMMISSION HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION PROGRAM: HOSPITAL TRANSPLANT
SAFETY, supra note 145, at 2. The Joint Commission requirement for a hospital to justify a decision
to forego a DCD policy became effective January 1, 2008. See Joint Commission, Approved: Revi-
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cy for all OPOs and transplant centers, which became effective July 1,
2007. n7 The mainstream
medical community has seemingly put its seal
148
of approval on DCD.

III. DEFINING DEATH

UNDER THE UDDA

Despite the apparent consensus in the transplant community on the
acceptability of DCD, a growing number of physicians and ethicists have
raised concerns about this approach to recovering organs. 149 With a few
notable exceptions, little attention has been given to this issue in the legal
community. 15 In addressing the current practice of DCD, it makes sense
to ask the question: does it matter whether we remove organs from those
who may not be quite dead?
The "dead donor rule" has become entrenched in the transplant
community: vital organs cannot be removed from a patient who is not
dead and organ retrieval cannot be the cause of death. 151 A number of
states codify the dead donor rule. For example, Maryland's version of
the UDDA states: "A pronouncement of death under this section shall be
made before any vital organ is removed for transplantation." 152 The
UAGA also implicitly recognizes that donors must be dead before organ
retrieval by providing that the gift of a vital organ is not effective until
the death of the donor. 153 The UAGA does not define death and to desions to StandardLD.3.110, Element of Performance 12, for CriticalAccess Hospitals and Hospitals, 27 JOINT COMM'N PERSPS. 6, 14 (2007).
147.
UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, MODEL ELEMENTS FOR CONTROLLED DCD
RECOVERY PROTOCOLS, UNOS Bylaws, app. B, attachment II
(2007), available at

http://www.unos.org/policiesandBylaws2/bylawsfUNOSByLaws/pdfs/bylawl 145.pdf.
148.
In 2006, a national initiative in Canada also recommended the adoption of DCD programs, using a five minute observation period before death could be declared. See Sam D. Shemie et
al., National Recommendationsfor Donation After CardiocirculatoryDeath in Canada, 175 CAN.
MED. ASS'N J. S 1, S6 (Supp. 2006).

149.
Jerry Menikoff, Less Bull, Better Bioethics, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1133, 1146-47
(2005) (reviewing ALBERT R. JONSEN, BIOETHICS BEYOND THE HEADLINES: WHO LIVES? WHO
DIS? WHO DECIDES? (2005)).
150.
See, e.g., Jerry Menikoff, The Importance Of Being Dead: Non-Heart-Beating Organ
Donation, 18 ISSUES L. & MED. 3 (2002); James M. DuBois, Is Organ Procurement Causing the
Death of Patients?, 18 ISSUES L. & MED. 21 (2002); Jerry Menikoff, Doubts About Death: The
Silence of the Institute of Medicine, 26 J. L. MED & ETHICS 157 (1998).
151.
Robert M. Arnold & Stuart J. Youngner, The Dead Donor Rule: Should We Stretch It,
Bend It,or Abandon It?, in PROCURING ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT, supra note 102, at 220-21.
Although John Robertson is credited with coining the term, it is not altogether clear when the dead
donor rule originated. Id. at 220. The idea that a donor has to been dead before vital organs are
removed dates at least as far back as the late 1960s. Id.
152.
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-202(b)(2) (West 2005); see also ALA. CODE § 22-313(a) (LexisNexis 2006) ("When a part of a donor is proposed to be used for transplantation.., there
shall be an independent confirmation of the death by another medical doctor licensed in Alabama.");
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327C-1(b) (LexisNexis 2008) ("Death shall be pronounced before.., any
vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (A) (2008)
("In any case when organs are to be used in a transplant, then an additional physician .... not a
member of the transplant team, must make the pronouncement of death."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-24(C) (LexisNexis 2008) ("Death is to be pronounced.., before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation ....
").
153.
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT,supra note 59, § 2(3).
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termine who is dead from the absence of either
brain or cardiac activity
15 4
requires looking at the state law defining death.
A.

The Meaning of "Irreversible"

In accordance with the UDDA, most states define cardiopulmonary
death as the "irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions" as determined by accepted medical standards. 15 Under the
UDDA, death is not merely the lack of circulation and respiration; for
death to occur, those functions must have irreversibly ceased. In recommending adoption of the UDDA, the President's Commission noted
that a clinical assessment of irreversibility will change with new medical
technology and capabilities. According to the Commission, "Many patients declared dead fifty years ago because of heart failure would have
not experienced an 'irreversible cessation of' circulatory
and respiratory
56
functions' in the hands of a modern hospital."'
Neither the UDDA nor its state counterparts define the term irreversible. The President's Commission was concerned primarily with
expanding the concept of brain death, and failed to address what is meant
by irreversibility of cardiopulmonary functions. 57 Further, although
death is to be determined under the UDDA according to accepted medical standards, no uniform standard for irreversibility exists in the DCD
context.' 58 In most areas of medicine, determining the precise moment
of death is not critical. 59 In DCD, however, minutes can mean the difference between a viable and nonviable organ.16° For practical reasons,
therefore, the point at which death becomes irreversible must be a very
short interval after heart stoppage; ergo, the basis for a two to five minute
waiting period.
The meaning of irreversible in the determination of death has been
the subject of much debate among physicians and medical ethicists.' 61
154.
Comments to the 1968 version of the UAGA state:
Subsection (b) leaves the determination of the time of death to the attending or certifying
physician. No attempt is made to define the uncertain point in time when life terminates.
The point is not subject to clear cut definition and medical authorities are currently working toward a consensus on the matter. . . . The real question is when have irreversible
changes taken place that preclude return to normal brain activity and self sustaining bodily functions.
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968) § 7, 8A U.L.A. 147 (2003).
155.
See Goldsmith, supra note 56, at 903.
156.

DEFINING DEATH, supranote 41, at 76.

157.
Id. at 76-77 (discussing the degree of brain damage necessary to meet irreversible cessation of functions).
158.
1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 61; see also Stuart J.Youngner et al., When is
"Dead"?, 29 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 14, 16 (1999) (noting that controversy about the meaning of
irreversibility has made it difficult to achieve consensus about the timing of death in DCD).
159.
1997 10M Report, supranote 90, at 57.
160. Id.
161.
See, e.g., Youngner et al., supra note 158, at 16 (stating that although the term irreversible
is used in both the law and clinical practice, its exact meaning is unclear); E.T. Bartlett, Differences
Between Death and Dying, 21 J. MED. ETHics 270, 274 (1995) (contending that the meaning of
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The term irreversible implies that more than a mere cessation of heartbeat is necessary for one to be dead. Otherwise, people who suffer cardiac arrest and are resuscitated are being literally brought back from the
dead. On the other hand, it is often difficult to determine the precise
moment of physiological death. 162 Physicians recognize that dying is a
process that culminates in a diagnosis of clinical death, yet the law requires a demarcation between life and death-the irreversible loss of
function of the organism. 63 James L. Bernat, lead author of the 2005
consensus conference report, argues that death is an event, not a
process.' 64 He believes that "[b]ecause all organisms must be either alive
' 65
or dead, death is an inherently discontinuous and instantaneous event."'
In both its 1997 and 2000 Reports, the IOM noted the difficulties
associated with the term irreversibility in DCD. "[E]xisting empirical
data cannot confirm or disprove a specific interval at which the cessation
of cardiopulmonary function becomes irreversible."' 66 The IOM reasoned that a five minute waiting period of time is an acceptable indication of irreversibility because a patient will not autoresuscitate after that
period of time, i.e. the patient will not resume circulation on his own
without medical assistance.167 Although James M. DuBois asserts that
"[t]he medical community has arrived at a moral certainty that circulatory and respiratory functions do not spontaneously resume ...after they
have been lost more than a couple of minutes,"' 168 there is little scientific
data to support this assumption.' 69 The five studies on which the IOM
relied were not direct studies of autoresuscitation and were conducted in
the early to mid-twentieth century, with the last one performed in
1970."70 In 1997, the IOM recommended further research to validate the

irreversibility is unambiguous and means "not capable of being reversed or reversing."); Tom Tomlinson, The Irreversibilityof Death: Reply to Cole, 3 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHIcs J., 157, 161 (1993)
(asserting that irreversibility is tied to the setting in which it is used); David J. Cole, The Reversibility of Death, 18 J. MED. ETHics 26, 29 (1992) (arguing that the concept of irreversibility should be
abandoned because it departs from conventional notions of death).
162.
DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 77 (recognizing that determining the time of death
can be "troublesome").
163.
Id. (noting that "death should be 'viewed not as process but as the event that separates the
process of dying from the process of disintegration').
164.
James L. Bernat, A Defense of the Whole-Brain Concept of Death, 28 HASTINGS CTR.
REPORT 14, 15 (1998).
165.
Id. at 16.
166.
2000 IOM Report supra, note 20, at 22; see also 1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 58
(citing a lack of scientific certainty in defining the interval for irreversibility).
167.
2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 22-23.
168.
DuBois, supra note 150, at 32.
169.
See DeVita, supra note 57, at 1710 ('The empirical data are sparse but suggest that 2
mins, rather than 5 mins, may be sufficient to ensure irreversible cessation of cardiopulmonary
function."); Youngner et al., supra note 158, at 15 (concluding that the data cited by the IOM on
autoresuscitation are "seriously flawed" and "provided the weakest possible evidence for a recommendation"); Rady et al., supra note 86, at 325 (suggesting the true incidence of autoresuscitation is
unknown because of underreporting).
170. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 22-23.
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of autoresuscitaappropriate interval necessary to exclude the possibility
72
tion.1 71 Those studies have not been undertaken.
Some critics of DCD do not dispute that the possibility of spontaneous recovery of circulation in controlled donors withdrawn from life
support is exceedingly unlikely. 73 They do question, however, whether
a body's inability to reverse circulation on its own carries the same
meaning as irreversible cessation of function under the UDDA.174 Irreversible cessation of cardiopulmonary function can be interpreted in different ways: (1) the patient's circulation will not spontaneously resume
absent outside intervention (autoresuscitation); (2) the patient's circulation will not be reversed because the patient or family has chosen to
withdraw life support and to refuse further resuscitative efforts; or (3) the
patient's circulation can not be reversed, even with cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR) or other technical means. 175 The IOM and the transplant community have chosen a combination of the first and second constructs of irreversibility: after two to five minutes, the patient is unlikely
to resume heart and lung functions on his own and circulation will not be
artificially started at the request of the patient or family. 76 The reason
the transplant community rejects the third meaning of irreversibility is
obvious: the patient can not be irreversibly dead when organs are propatients
cured after just two to five minutes of asystole because many
77
can be successfully resuscitated after this short an interval.
Although the UDDA does not define "irreversible" or address organ
donation, a few states favor a strict construction of irreversible in their
death statutes. For example, Oklahoma law provides: "A determination
of death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards;
provided however all reasonable attempts to restore spontaneous circulatory or respiratory functions shall first be made, prior to such declaration."' 178 The Virginia statute also mandates that before a person is de-

1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 59 (stating there was a need to collect data to conduct
171.
the appropriate interval).
2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 24 (noting that the studies it recommended had not
172.
been undertaken); see also Bernat et al., supra note 24, at 282 (stating in 2005 consensus conference
report that studies on the minimum period of observation necessary to rule out resuscitation had not
been conducted).

173.

The possibility of spontaneous circulation is an issue with uncontrolled donors in whom

resuscitation has been attempted, however. See infra note 264 and accompanying text.
See Joanne Lynn, Are the Patients Who Become Organ Donors Under the Pittsburgh
174.
Protocol for "Non-Heart-Beating Donors" Really Dead?, in PROCURING ORGANS FOR
TRANSPLANT, supra note 102, at 98-99 (stating that the two-minute waiting period in the Pittsburg

protocol may not be wrong, but it is a departure from conventional notions of irreversibility).
175.
176.
177.

2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 24.
Id.
See infra notes 212, 213 and accompanying text.

178.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3122(2) (West 2004).
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clared dead, a physician must 79
confirm that all further attempts at resuscitation would be unsuccessful.
There is a paucity of case law on the meaning of irreversible cessation of circulatory functions under the UDDA, but the little that exists
appears to support a definition of irreversible that is at odds with current
DCD practice. In a 1995 Michigan case, the district attorney charged the
defendant with negligent vehicular homicide of an infant born after an
emergency caesarean section. 180 The baby had no discernible heartbeat
or respiratory effort for at least ten minutes after delivery. 1 8 1 Medical
personnel were able to detect a heart rate fifteen minutes after birth and
gasping respirations ten minutes later. 182 Under Michigan law, negligent
homicide has to cause the death of a person, which excludes viable fetuses not born alive.183 The defendant contended he could not be charged
with homicide because the infant was not alive at birth. 84 The court
struggled with how to define "alive" and looked to Michigan's version of
the UDDA to determine if the child was bom "dead." 185 The court concluded that because heart and respiratory functions were restored, albeit
many minutes after delivery, the child did not have irreversible cessation
of circulatory and respiratory functions at birth.1 86 The fact that the child
required medical intervention to restore circulation did not preclude a
finding that the child was born alive. "Otherwise," the court reasoned,
187
"the use of the word 'irreversible' becomes meaningless."
A few other cases have reached a similar conclusion. In Jefferson
County v. Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (In re Johnson), 88 a
hospital appealed from a finding by county commissioners that it was not
entitled to payment for emergency resuscitation rendered to an indigent
patient. 189 The commissioners found that due to an asthma attack, the
patient had suffered cardiac arrest at 5:19 p.m. and had no pulse, blood

179.
A person shall be medically and legally dead if.. . there is the absence of spontaneous
respiratory and spontaneous cardiac functions and, because of the disease or condition which directly
or indirectly caused these functions to cease, or because of the passage of time since these functions
ceased, attempts at resuscitation would not, in the opinion of such physician, be successful in restoring spontaneous life-sustaining functions, and, in such event, death shall be deemed to have occurred
at the time these functions ceased. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972(A)(1) (West 2005).
180.
People v. Selwa, 543 N.W.2d 321, 322-23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
181.
Id. at 323 (citing expert testimony that the baby's Apgar scores at one, five and ten minutes following birth were zero, which meant that the heart rate and respiratory effort were virtually
nonexistent).
182. Id. The infant was removed from the respirator after a few hours and declared brain dead.
Id.
183. Id. at 324. The intentional or willful killing of an "unborn quick child" is, however,
punishable as manslaughter. MicI-. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West 2004).
184. Selwa, 543 N.W.2d at 323.
185. Id. at 325.
186. See id. at 328.
187. Id. at 328.
188.
883 P.2d 1084 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994).
189. Id. at 1085-86.
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pressure, and respirations at 5:45 p.m. 190 The patient remained unresponsive during transport and arrived at the hospital cyanotic 9' and incontinent of urine and stool. 192 Despite the patient's status, the emergency room physician began resuscitation efforts that did not cease until
6:28 p.m. 193 The commissioners decided that because the patient was
dead on arrival at the hospital, the treatment rendered was neither reasonable nor necessary. 194 Reversing the commissioner's denial of payment, the court stated:
The only evidence which contrasted with the doctor's medical opinion was testimony from Johnson's husband who believed that his
wife had died on their lawn while being attended by the paramedics.
This lay testimony, however, was insufficient to supplant the expert
opinion of the doctor as to whether there was a reasonable prospect
that the cessation of Johnson's life functions could be reversed when
she arrived at the hospital. 195
A recent (and rather peculiar) case nicely illustrates the ordinary
understanding of irreversibility. Prior to his wife's filing of an action for
divorce, Joseph Finnegan had suffered three heart attacks, but had been
successfully resuscitated each time.196 He moved to dismiss the action
on the ground the court had no jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage because he had died on three occasions and the parties' marriage ended
upon his death. 197 The court rebuffed defendant's claims, noting that he
and that his "alleged deaths were neither permanent nor irrestill existed
' 198
versible."
The rapid declaration of death in DCD donors serves the broader
goal of increasing the supply of organs. Yet, the price of this achievement is an acknowledgment among DCD proponents that death is contextual and irreversibility is defined by the intent of the patient. 99 To
satisfy the dead donor rule, DCD proponents have to disregard the conventional understanding of irreversibility, i.e. whether it is possible to
reverse a cardiac arrest. According to DCD supporters, because controlled donors choose to be withdrawn from life support and it would be
unethical, if not legally wrong, to resuscitate these individuals, it is acceptable to construe irreversibility to mean that we will not reverse, not
190.
Id. at 1086.
191.
Cyanosis is a dark bluish color of the skin due to a lack of oxygen. STEDMAN'S MED.
DICTIONARY, supra note 118, at 475.
192. In re Johnson, 883 P.2d at 1086.
193.
Id.
Id.
194.
Id. at 1087 (emphasis supplied).
195.
196. Finnegan v. Finnegan, No. FA074031514, 2008 WL 642627, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb.
19, 2008) (unpublished).
197.
Id.
198.
Id. at *2.
See DuBois, supra note 150, at 32-33 (recommending that irreversibility be determined
199.
contextually).
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that we cannot reverse, circulatory functions. 20 0 The irreversibility of
heart function is thus a moral, not a physiological, reality that promotes
the social objectives of organ transplantation.0 1
Further evidence that irreversibility may have a different meaning in
the DCD context is the frequent substitution of the word "permanent" for
"irreversible" cessation of respiration and circulation. 20 2 In accepting the
weak construal of irreversibility to mean that resuscitation will not be
attempted, the report of the 2005 Consensus Conference notes: "This
meaning of 'irreversibility' also has been called the 'permanent' cessation of respiration and circulation. If data show that autoresuscitation...
cannot occur and if there is no attempt at artificial resuscitation, it can be
concluded that respiration and circulation have ceased permanently. 2 3
Jerry Menikoff is highly critical of this pragmatic definition of irreversible circulatory death.2 4 He suggests that the intent of the patient
plays no role in the determination of death under the UDDA and that
cardiopulmonary function is not irreversibly lost as long as it could conceivably be restored by resuscitation efforts.20 5 Others agree. E.T. Bartlett is critical of the Pittsburgh protocol because it confuses being dead
with dying.
Surely, no one would seriously argue that the condition of a patient, two minutes post-arrest, who is unable on his own to return to a normal rhythm is, ipso facto, dead. If that were true
then we should6 now refuse CPR on similar patients because
2
they are dead! 0
Alexander Morgan Capron, executive director of the President's
Commission, also argues that the weak construal of irreversibility is inconsistent with the UDDA because there are not two kinds of deathcirculatory and neurological-but only one phenomenon based on different criteria. 20 7 "Thus," he concludes, "replacing 'irreversible cessation of

200. See John Robertson, The Dead Donor Rule, HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at
6, 12 ("[I]t is difficult to see why one should adopt a construal of irreversibility that ignores whether
the patient could in fact legally or morally be resuscitated."); see also Tomlinson, supra note 161, at
162 (concluding that, in a patient who has refused life-sustaining care, "medical means for reversing
cardiopulmonary arrest are no longer ethically significant possibilities").
201.
See Tomlinson, supra note 161, at 162-63 (distinguishing between the physiological and
functional criteria for death).
202. See 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 146 (concluding that the term "permanent" loss
of function is a reasonable interpretation of irreversibility under the UDDA).
203. Bernat et al., supra note 24, at 282.
204.

See Jerry Menikoff, Doubts About Death: The Silence of the Institute of Medicine, 26 J.L.

MED & ETHICS 157, 158-61 (1999).
205. Id. at 158.
206. Bartlett, supra note 161, at 274.
207. Alexander Morgan Capron, The Bifurcated Legal Standardfor Determining Death, in
THE DEFINITION OF DEATH CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES 117, 133 (Stuart J. Youngner et al.

eds., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1999).
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circulatory of respiratory functions' with 'we choose not to reverse' flies
inthe face ofin the UDDA's underlying premise.,,201
Inaddition, lungs are increasingly being recovered from DCD donors with promising results, 20 9 and, with the Denver Children's Hospital
program, we know there have been at least three DCD heart transplantations.21 ° Whatever definition of irreversibility is chosen, it seems inconsistent to say that a person's heart and lungs irreversibly ceased when
they are later transplanted and revived in recipients. Simply put, "[I]f a
whom it was taken cannot have been
heart is restarted, the person from 211
criteria.,
cardiac
to
dead according
B. Are There Two Kinds of Death Under the UDDA?

Adding to the controversy is the fact that the brain may still be functioning in DCD donors at the time of organ procurement. Irreversible
brain damage usually does not occur within two to five minutes of asystole.2 t2 Many patients will survive and have normal neurological function if resuscitated at this point.21 3 Even supporters of DCD admit that it
may take ten to fifteen minutes of no circulation for the brain to suffer
irreparable damage.21 4 New resuscitative therapies demonstrate the possibilities that a patient may survive neurologically intact even after prolonged cardiac arrest 2 15 and that the poor survival rates and neurological
outcomes associated with cardiac arrest may be due, at least in part, to
216
outmoded clinical practices.
Id.
208.
209.
See, e.g., David G6mez de Antonio etal., Results of Clinical Lung Transplantfrom UncontrolledNon-Heart-BeatingDonors, 26 J. HEART & LUNG TRANSPLANTATION 529, 533 (2007).
See Boucek et al., supra note 9, at 710. It is more accurate to say Denver Children's
210.
Hospital performed three modem DCD heart transplants. The first heart transplants performed by
Christian Barnard in the late 1960s took place before the concept of brain death arose and it is not
clear whether the patients satisfied brain death criteria. See MARGARET LOCK, TWICE DEAD:
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND THE REINVENTION OF DEATH 80, 87 (Univ. Cal. Press 2002).
Robert M. Veatch, DonatingHearts After CardiacDeath-Reversingthe Irreversible,359
211.
NEW ENG. J.MED. 672, 673 (2008).
212. See DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 17 (recognizing that a four to six minute loss of
blood flow does not irreversibly damage the brainstem). See also Lynn, supra note 174, at 99 (stating that "no one" would argue that the brain would cease functioning after only two minutes without
oxygen).
213. See Lynn, supra note 174, at 99 (noting there would be a "legion" of examples of people
surviving with intact brain function after cessation of the heartbeat for two minutes). In fact, one
bioethicist has suggested that patients may not even be unconscious after only two minutes of asystole. Robert M. Veatch, Consent for Perfusion and Other Dilemmas with Organ Procurementfrom
Non-Heart Beating Donors,in PROCURING ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT, supra note 102, at 198.
See DuBois, supra note 150, at 34 (noting that it would probably take ten to fifteen mi214.
nutes after arrest for the brain to die); see also DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 16-17 ("If deprived of blood flow for at least 10-15 minutes, the brain, including the brainstem, will completely
cease functioning.").
215.
See Rady et al., supra note 86, at 327-28 (stating that patients resuscitated with extracorporeal perfusion are able to recover after much longer periods than two to five minutes of cardiorespiratory arrest); see also infra notes 278-85 and accompanying text.
216.
See Myron K, Weisfeldt & Lance B. Becker, Resuscitation After CardiacArrest, A 3Phase Time-Sensitive Mode, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 3035, 3036 (2002) (stating that although sur-
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In response to concerns that the brain is not irreversibly damaged
after two to five minutes, proponents of a short waiting period point to
the UDDA, under which, they assert, death can be determined by either
the cessation of brain or cardiopulmonary functions.217 Thus, loss of
circulation is an independent determination of death, unrelated to whether there is irreversible loss of brain function. 218 Nonsense, says Menikoff. Accusing the IOM of "shading the truth,' '219 Menikoff contends
the history of the UDDA conclusively dispels the notion there are two
different kinds of death. 220 Death occurs when the organism ceases 22to
function as a whole, and not when death comes to particular parts. 1
Citing an influential 1981 article by Capron and Leon R. Kass, Menikoff states that "cardiopulmonary criteria were being retained [in the
proposed statute] precisely because they gave clear results in the easy
cases, where it was quite evident that brain function had ceased ....,223
The President's Commission also looked upon death as a unitary phenomenon. 224 Consideration was given by the Commission to a statute that
would contain only a definition of brain death but circulatory death was
included as alternative criteria because "the loss of spontaneous
breath' 225
ing and heartbeat are surrogates for the loss of brain functions.
Bernat, who today is an ardent supporter of DCD, previously criticized the Pittsburgh protocol because it was not clear the donors were
brain dead after only two minutes.226 He stated:
Tests measuring circulation for the patient not receiving cardiopulmonary support assess the prolonged absence of heartbeat (asystole
or ventricular fibrillation) and the prolonged absence of breathing
(apnea). These are adequate tests for death in this context because
they lead directly to the destruction of the brain and all other organs.
The cessation of heartbeat and breathing must be prolonged because
their absence must be of sufficient duration for the brain to become

vival rates are poor after ten minutes of cardiac arrest, it is unknown whether this is due to irreversible injury or the failure of current therapeutic approaches).
217.
See 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 24 (asserting that there is no basis for a requirement that death by cardiopulmonary criteria must be of sufficient duration to cause the loss of brain
function).
218.
Id.; see also Bemat et al., supra note 24, at 281 (stating that the cardiopulnonary standard
may be used when the donor can not meet brain death criteria).
219. Menikoff, supra note 204, at 162.
220. Id. at 160.
221.
See ALEXANDER MORGAN CAPRON, The Report of the President's Commission on the
Uniform Determinationof Death Act, in DEATH: BEYOND WHOLE BRAIN CRITERIA, supra note 51,

at 156.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See Capron & Kass, supra note 46, at 113-14.
Menikoff, supra note 204, at 159-60.
DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 7.
Id.at 37.
Bemat, supra note 164, at 20.
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diffusely infarcted and for the227cessation of heartbeat and breathing
conclusively to be irreversible.
Similarly, one of the originators of DCD, the Maastrich University Hospital in The Netherlands, rejects the Pittsburgh protocol, preferring instead a ten-minute waiting time before organ procurement "to be sure
that the patient's brain is irreversibly damaged and an equivalent situation to brain death has been reached. 2 28
Intertwined with the problematic issue of whether controlled donors
have irreversible brain functions is the increasing post-mortem use of
artificial resuscitation to ensure viability of the organs. One technique
used to preserve organs in the donor is extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO), where blood is circulated through an oxygenating system. 229 ECMO, which is a modification of the heart-lung machine used
during bypass surgery, is often employed as a resuscitative intervention
in those who have experienced cardiac arrest. 230 In DCD, however,
ECMO is begun after the patient is declared dead to restore blood flow
and to preserve the organs.2 3 ' Once the heart is perfused with oxygen
through ECMO, it may begin to beat again.232 A recent editorial in Anesthesia, a British journal, described an "astonished audience" at an international conference in London in 2006 when it heard that a medical center in the United States was experimenting with ECMO after only two
213
As
minutes of pulseless activity, resulting in reanimation of the heart.
critics have pointed out, claiming that the patient has died and then reversing the circulatory arrest seems to profoundly misapply the irreversi234
bility requirement.
Michael A. DeVita acknowledges that a problem in non-heartbeating donation is that brain function can return after cardiac arrest if
resuscitative attempts restore circulation within five to ten minutes.235
227.
228.

Id.
Koostra et al., supra note 91, at 2893.

See Joseph F. Magliocca et al., ExtracorporealSupport for Organ DonationAfter Cardiac
229.
Death Effectively Expands the Donor Pool, 58 J. TRAUMA 1095, 1096-97 (2005).

230.

David Bracco et al., The Thin Line Between Life and Death, 33 INTENSIVE CARE MED.

751, 751 (2007).

Magliocca et al., supra note 229, at 1096.
231.
Carla DeJohn & Joseph B. Zwischenberger, Ethical Implications of ExtracorporealInter232.
val Support for Organ Retrieval, 52 AM. SOC'Y ARTIFICIAL INTERNAL ORGANS J. 119, 121 (2006);
see also Magliocca et al., supra note 229, at 1097.
Non-Heart-BeatingOrgan Donation, supra note 91, at 432-33.
233.
234.
Joanne Lynn & Ronald Cranford, The Persisting Perplexities in the Determination of
Death, in THE DEFINITION OF DEATH CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES, supra note 207, at 106
(stating that restoring circulation after a determination of death is evidence of "confused thinking"
and a misapplication of the criteria for irreversibility).
DeVita et al., supra note 57, at 1711. Michael DeVita is a professor at the University of
235.
Pittsburgh School of Medicine. Id. at 1709. See also Christopher James Doig & Graham Rocker,
Retrieving Organsfrom Non-Heart-Beating Organ Donors: A Review of Medical and Legal Issues,
50 CAN. J. ANESTHESIA 1069, 1072 (2003) (suggesting that if circulatory functions and blood flow
to the brain are restored, it is possible that patients could experience pain or even regain consciousness).
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The practice of restoring circulation through ECMO or other techniques
raises the possibility that the brain is also being resuscitated while the
recovery of organs is ongoing.236 Some advocates of DCD nevertheless
encourage resuscitation of victims of cardiac arrest for the sole purpose
of preserving organ viability for procurement.237 The New York City
organ recovery program envisions the transplant ambulance team continuing CPR and administering oxygen to the victim who had previously
been declared dead in order to maintain blood flow during transport to
the hospital.23 8 This raises the specter of limited brain resuscitation.239
Critics argue that if transplant surgeons are to use artificial means to restore circulation, it becomes imperative to wait in excess of ten minutes
to confirm the total cessation of the entire brain before ECMO or other
techniques are used.24 ° Otherwise, it may be possible for at least some
patients to regain brain functions, including awareness or the perception
of pain.24 t
C. A Not So Uniform Determinationof Death
In adopting the weaker construct of irreversibility, the transplant
community has embraced a definition of death that is conducive to organ
procurement but is at odds with the UDDA and the intentions of the
President's Commission. For example, patients A and B are both in the
intensive care unit.242 A is a potential donor and refuses CPR. Patient B
236. Joseph L. Verheijde et al., Recovery of Transplantable Organs After Cardiacor Circulatory Death: Transforming the Paradigmfor the Ethics of Organ Donation, 2 PHILOSOPHY, ETHICS
& HUMANITIES IN MED. 1, 3 (2007) (asserting that post-mortem technology to preserve organs
results in the resuscitation of the heart and brain), available at http://www.pehmed.com/content/pdf/1747-5341-2-8.pdf.
237. See, e.g., Mary Bennett & Niranjan Kissoon, Is CardiopulmonaryResuscitation Warranted in Children Who Suffer CardiacArrest Post Trauma?,23 PEDIATRIC EMERGENCY CARE 267,
271 (2007) (stating that the possibility of organ donation may be a reason to attempt a prolonged
resuscitation); see also 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 158 ("[P]remature removal of mechanical support can be a major barrier to organ donation.").
238. Stein, supra note 3, at AOl.
239. M.D.D. Bell, Non-Heart Beating Organ Donation: Old Procurement Strategy-New
Ethical Problems, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 176, 179 (stating that the combination of cardiac massage and
administration of oxygen after death "may be associated with some restoration of brain functions").
240. Verheijde et al., supra note 236, at 3. To assuage the concerns of medical personnel about
post-mortem beating of the heart, some transplant centers use a thoracic aortic balloon or lidocaine
to prevent reanimation of the heart during ECMO. See DeJohn & Zwischenberger, supra note 232,
at 121. Using a thoracic balloon will also prevent perfusion to the brain, thus avoiding the problem
of brain resuscitation during ECMO. Bernat, supra note 14, at 671.
241.
This is theoretical, of course, because once organs are removed and the patient dies, we
cannot know whether the patient had any such experience. There is also a debate in the medical
community about whether it is possible for patients to regain cognition or experience pain after only
five minutes of absent blood flow. See Martha A. Q.Curley et al., Letters to the Editor, Organ
Donation After CardiacDeath: Are We Willing to Abandon the Dead Donor Rule? The Author's
Reply, 8 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 507, 508 (2007) (stating that studies show patients' cognition and the ability to perceive pain are likely absent after five minutes of no cardiac output); Doig &
Rocker, supra note 235, at 1072 (questioning whether patients in DCD protocols could experience
pain or regain consciousness when brain perfusion is restored by mechanical means).
242.
This scenario is adapted from a similar hypothetical described in Youngner et al., supra
note 158, at 17.
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has stated that he wants CPR if he arrests. According to current DCD
practice, A can be declared dead after at least two minutes of cardiopulmonary arrest. B also suffers two minutes of asystole and apnea, but
resuscitative efforts are started. Is B dead after two minutes? If B is
successfully resuscitated, was he brought back from the dead, or was he
not dead in the first place? The answer under the UDDA is that B is not
dead because he did not suffer irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions. Using the weaker construal of irreversibility only
for organ donors but not for other patients who suffer cardiac arrest contravenes the purpose of the UDDA, which was to set uniform criteria for
the determination of death in all individuals. As the President's Commission commented:
[S]ince the proposed statute is intended to apply in all situations, it
ought not to be incorporated into a state's Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act (UAGA). Placing it there would create the mistaken impression
needs to be applied to organ transthat a special "definition" of death
243
plantation, which is not the case.
DCD advocates point out that under the UDDA, the determination
of death is to be made in accordance with accepted medical standards.
Since the medical community has found DCD ethical, they reason, it
falls within the standard of care. 244 But declaring a person dead after two
to five minutes of absent circulation is not the medical standard of care
for all patients. 245 For those who experience sudden cardiac arrest, aggressive resuscitation is the rule.246 Under the UDDA, proof of death is
both a medical and legal question.24 7 The question for medical experts is
whether there is biological evidence of life (or death), not whether the
patient has chosen to live or die.248 There is no separate test of death for
249
organ transplant purposes.
Further, to argue that the medical criteria for determining death
have evolved since the 1980s in an effort to shorten the time in which

243. DEFINING DEATH, supra note 41, at 80. Neither does the UAGA purport to define death
for purposes of organ transplantation. Id. at 145.
244. See DuBois, supra note 150, at 33.
245.
Kimmo Sainio, Are Non-Heart-BeatingDonors Really Dead?, 29 ANNALS MED. 473, 474
(1997) (noting that in an emergency room, a patient with unexpected asystole would not be declared
dead after two minutes).
246. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
247.
Randles v. Ind. Patient's Comp. Fund, 860 N.E.2d 1212, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
See id. ("it is the role of the medical professional to decide whether brain death or other
248.
cessation of cardiopulmonary function is present in accordance with current medical standards")
(quoting 22 AM. JUR. 2D Death § 424); see also UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH Acr (1980),
supra note 17, prefatory note ("Time of death is a fact to be determined with all others in each individual case, and may be resolved, when in doubt, upon expert testimony before the appropriate
court.").
249.
See In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 595 (Fla. 1992) (finding that anencephalic infant who
lacked higher brain functions could not be declared legally dead for purposes of organ donation).
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death is diagnosed is to stand medical progress on its head.25 ° If anything, recent resuscitative techniques have demonstrated that some individuals whom physicians would have declared dead even a few years ago
can survive and lead productive lives. 1
The goal of increasing organs for transplantation is worthwhile, but
whether there ought to be different definitions of death, depending on the
context, is an issue that deserves greater scrutiny and public discussion
before DCD attains widespread use. There is also some value in treating
all individuals equally. "Otherwise," commentators have noted, "patients would be dead or alive, depending on whether or not they were
organ donors. ,,252
The lack of consistency among hospital protocols in the pronouncement of death is also troublesome.253 If Sue is withdrawn from
life support in Pittsburg, she is dead after two minutes without evidence
of cardiac activity. IfSue is in Shreveport, Louisiana, she will not be
declared irreversibly dead until five minutes transpire after asystole.254
In other words, in Shreveport, Sue is just mostly dead after two minutes
and her organs cannot be recovered while, in Pittsburg, Sue is really dead
and her organs can be taken. In 1997, the IOM criticized as "uncomfortable" a situation where a donor could be considered dead in one OPO
region while defined as alive in another.25 5 Nevertheless, just three years
later, the IOM countenanced such inconsistencies when it concluded that
there was "room for significant differences of opinion" on the interval
required to assure the irreversibility of circulatory functions.25 6 This
leaves patients or families who are considering donation in a disconcerting situation where they may not know or be able to choose which version of "death" will be applied to them.
Such variations in the timing of death do not engender confidence in
the organ transplant system, which depends on the trust of potential donors and their families that a physician will not prematurely declare them
dead to harvest organs. It also does not comport with the UDDA, which
envisioned that there would be a uniform definition of death in every
jurisdiction.

250. See 2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 146 (asserting that evolving medical standards
support the weak construal of irreversibility).
251.
See discussion infra Part W.A.
252.
Stuart J. Youngner & Robert M. Arnold, Philosophical Debates About the Definition of
Death: Who Cares?,26 J. MED. & PHIL. 527, 531 (2001).

253.
See Youngner et al., supra note 158, at 20 (arguing for uniformity among protocols to
avoid public criticism).
254.
LA. STATE UNIV. HEALTH SCI. CTR.-SHREVEPORT, ORGAN DONATION AFTER CARDIAC
DEATH (DCD) PROTOCOL LOUISIANA ORGAN PROCUREMENT AGENCY (LOPA) 4 (2008),

http://www.sh.lsuhsc.edu/policies/policy-manuals-via ms word/hospital-policy/h_5.7.1.pdf.
255.
1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 59.
256. 2000 IOM Report, supra note 20, at 39.
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IV. THE EXPANSION OF DCD IN UNCONTROLLED DONORS AND
CHILDREN

Does this academic discussion about the time of death in DCD matter? Those prospective donors who are voluntarily withdrawn from life
support in a hospital are not going to be resuscitated and their brain function will soon be irretrievably lost due to lack of cardiac function. In
other words, in a few more minutes, they are going to be all dead, not
just mostly dead. At least a persuasive utilitarian argument can be made
that we should remove their organs to benefit those desperately in need
of "the gift of life" while the organs are still useful. Yet, as the New
York City proposal for organ recovery ambulances demonstrates, DCD
practices are also being applied to victims who suffer cardiac arrest outside the hospital. Children are also viewed as potential DCD donors;
indeed, doctors conducted the first DCD pediatric heart transplants quite
recently. There are compelling reasons, however, why organ procurement from uncontrolled donors and children should proceed slowly.
A. Uncontrolled Donors
Most current DCD protocols in the United States focus on the controlled donor as the time of cardiopulmonary arrest is known and warm
ischemia time can be minimized through careful planning of the organ
procurement process.257 However, uncontrolled donors, i.e., those who
suffer an unexpected or sudden cardiac arrest and who are not brain
dead, may comprise the largest group of untapped donors. 8 Approximately thirty-eight percent of all deaths occur outside a hospital.2 59 The
IOM estimates that if persons undergoing unsuccessful resuscitation
were considered as potential organ donors, there could be an additional
22,000 cadaveric donors each year.260
There is a "powerful potential conflict" between the interest of the
prospective uncontrolled donor in a thorough and lengthy resuscitative
effort and the interest of the future recipient in a viable organ procured
soon after cardiac arrest. 26 1 If DCD is expanded to potential uncontrolled
donors, will physicians wait only two to five minutes after cessation of
cardiac and pulmonary functions before removing organs? The New
York City proposal suggests that the same standard will apply: organ

257. Controlled donors were the primary focus of the 1997 and 2000 IOM reports and the 2005
consensus conference.
258. 2006 IOM report, supra note 86, at 154 (citing an estimate of 335,000 deaths a year due to
sudden cardiac arrest).
259. Akinlolu 0. Ojo et al., Quantifying Organ Donation Rates by Donation Service Area, 5
AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 958, 961 (2005).

260.
261.

2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 156.
1997 IOM Report, supranote 90, at 60.

2009]

REDEFINING WHO IS LEGALLY DEAD

recovery ambulances will begin organ preservation methods five minutes
after death is declared in the field.262
With the controlled donor, the patient or family has chosen to forego resuscitative measures and, in the absence of autoresuscitation, is
dead (or at least soon will be dead). But with the uncontrolled donor,
there is no presumption that resuscitation is not desired. The American
Heart Association's current resuscitation guidelines state that "all patients in cardiac arrest should receive resuscitation," unless one of three
criteria is met: the patient has a do not resuscitate order, the patient has
signs of irreversible death such as rigor mortis, or no physiological benefit will be expected. 22663 In other words, "irreversibility" in the context of
uncontrolled donors means that circulation cannot be restarted with current medical technology.
The claim that a DCD donor is irreversibly dead because there is no
possibility of self-resuscitation after a two-minute period of asystole is
also suspect when applied to victims of sudden cardiac arrest who undergo CPR. The medical literature speaks of the "Lazarus phenomenon,"
where patients who have been declared dead after unsuccessful resuscitation have a delayed, unexpected return of spontaneous circulation. 2 6
The time from termination of CPR to return of spontaneous circulation in
these patients ranges from a few minutes to as long as twenty minutes
with functional recovery.265 Some of these cases of "resurrection" have
received widespread public attention. For example, Richard Selzer, a
surgeon, wrote about his recovery after being declared dead.266 While in
the ICU, Selzer experienced a cardiac arrest. 267 Despite vigorous resuscitation, he had no heartbeat and a flat tracing on an ECG for over four and
a half minutes.26 8 The attending nurse entered the time of death and ten
minutes later observed body characteristics compatible with death.269
Suddenly, Selzer began to breathe, tracing returned to the ECG, and the
heartbeat became regular.27 ° On his discharge from the hospital, Selzer

262. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
263. 2005 American Heart Association Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and
Emergency CardiovascularCare, Part 2: Ethical Issues, 112 CIRCuLATION V-6, IV-7 (2005),
available at http://circ.ahajoumals.org/cgi/reprintl 12/24_supplI1V-6.
264. See Vedamurthy Adhiyaman et al., The Lazarus Phenomenon, J. ROYAL. SOC. MED. 552,
552 (2007) (stating that there have been thirty-eight reported cases in the medical literature of delayed spontaneous return of circulation). The article also cited a number of media reports in which
patients were declared dead, but were later found alive. Id. at 555.
265. Id. at 553, Table 1; see also Antti Kamariinen et al., Spontaneous Defibrillation After
Cessation of Resuscitation in Out-Of-Hospital CardiacArrest: A Case of Lazarus Phenomenon, 75

RESUSCITATION 543, 544 (2007) (describing the case of a man in a body bag who was observed
breathing spontaneously fifteen minutes after resuscitation ended).
266. LOCK, supranote 210, at 54-55.
267. Id. at 55.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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stated, "Next time hold a feather to my lips. It's more reliable., 27 1 These
cases are uncommon, 272 but they raise serious questions about whether
very brief intervals between the cessation of CPR and the process of organ recovery should be used in uncontrolled donation when resuscitation
efforts have been previously attempted. 3 To exclude the possibility of
an errant diagnosis of death, several commentators have recommended
that patients be observed for at least ten minutes after CPR has ended
before confirming death to rule out the possibility of a delayed return of
spontaneous circulation.2 74 Otherwise, it may be the removal of organs
that makes the uncontrolled donor's cessation of circulatory functions
"irreversible."
New resuscitative techniques also hold much promise for those who
suffer prolonged cardiac arrest and have made it more difficult to determine when there is an irreversible cessation of circulatory functions that
would justify termination of CPR. Survival rates in individuals who suffer sudden cardiac arrest have historically been dismal. With out-ofhospital CPR, survival ranges between five and twenty-one percent. 75
In-hospital CPR results in an average fifteen percent survival rate.276
Many of those surviving have poor neurological outcomes.277 By using
cardiopulmonary bypass as part of integrated resuscitative therapy, a
recent study demonstrated a seventy-nine percent survival rate in thirtyfour victims with prolonged cardiac arrest,278 with minimal neurological
damage.2 79 Although this was a small patient population, the authors
conclude that "[r]ecovery without adverse neurological outcomes is possible in a large number of cardiac arrest victims following prolonged manual CPR. , 280 Another report documents the usefulness of ECMO in
271.
Id. (quoting RICHARD SELZER, RAISING THE DEAD 99 (Penguin Books 1994)).
272.
The true incidence of Lazarus phenomenon may be unknown because of underreporting.
Adhiyaman et al., supra note 264, at 552; see also Wolfgang H. Maleck et al., Unexpected Return of
Spontaneous Circulation After Cessation of Resuscitation (Lazarus Phenomenon), 39
RESUSCITATION 125, 127 (1998) (suggesting that the true incidence of the phenomenon may be
fairly high and that its underreporting is due to legal concerns).
273.
The Lazarus phenomenon is by definition applicable to those who have previously been
subjected to resuscitation efforts and, therefore, would not apply to controlled donors who have
chosen to forego CPR. See Sam D. Shemie, Clarifying the Paradigmfor the Ethics of Donation and
Transplantation: Was "Dead" Really so Clear Before Organ Donation?, 2 PHIL., ETHICS, &

HUMAN. IN MED. 1, 4 (2007), available at http://www.peh-med.com/content/pdf/1747-5341-218.pdf.
274.
Adhiyaman et al., supra note 264, at 555 (recommending that patients be passively monitored for at least ten minutes, if not longer, after the cessation of CPR); Kitmarainen et al., supra note
265, at 545 (advocating minimum of ten minutes of monitoring to rule out Lazarus phenomenon).
275.
Constantine.L. Athanasuleas et al., Sudden CardiacDeath: Directingthe Scope of Resus-

citation Towards the Heartand Brain, 70 RESUSCITATION 44, 45 (2006).
276.
Id.
277.
Id. at 45, 47.
278.
The patients in the study had experienced periods of refractory cardiac arrest ranging from
twenty minutes to one and one-half hours. Id. at 46-47.
279.
Id. at 49 (stating that only two of the thirty-four patients had an adverse neurological
outcome).
280. Id. at 45.
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refractory cardiac arrest, including the case of a four-year-old boy who
had undergone three hours of CPR before ECMO was started.2 81 He
survived and had normal neurological function on discharge from the
hospital.282 Additional studies confirm the significant strides in survival
rates made possible by resuscitation through ECMO, cardiopulmonary
bypass, or hypothermia (cooling of the body temperature).283 One commentator suggests that with current technology, the limits of brain resuscitation after cardiac arrest can not be definitively established:
In reality, the duration of circulatory arrest that precludes recovery of
any residual amount of brain function is unknown but is lengthening.
Although arrest time is paramount, the conditions of the cardiac arrest (temperature) and the manner in which the circulation is reestablished (e.g., hypertensive reperfusion, hypothermia, neuroprotective agents) will extend the time for potential recovery
of various
284
degrees of brain function well beyond 10 minutes.
The success of these new interventions raises difficult questions
about who decides whether a person arriving in the emergency room
after cardiac arrest will be subjected to techniques like ECMO to reverse
the cardiac arrest or will be declared dead and then have ECMO to preserve the organs for donation. In essence, "Where is the line between
refractory cardiac arrest-making the patient a potential candidate for
ECLS [extracorporeal life support] and 'irreversible
cardiac arrest285
making the patient a potential organ donor?
Even some supporters of DCD question whether the weak construal
of irreversibility in controlled donors who choose not to be resuscitated
should apply in other contexts. DuBois calls for a "stricter sense of irreversibility" in situations that do not involve the controlled donor. 86 In
1997, the IOM similarly warned that where death is unexpected or sudden, longer periods of observation may be necessary to ensure that the
cardiac arrest is truly irreversible. 87 Yet seven years later, without explanation, the IOM suggested that with uncontrolled donors, a hands-off
281.
Bracco et al., supra note 230, at 751.
282. Id.
283. See Massimo Massetti et al., Back from Irreversibility: ExtracorporealLife Support for
Prolonged CardiacArrest, 79 ANN. THORACIC SURGERY 178, 181 (2005) (demonstrating increased
survival rates in patients with refractory cardiac arrest who received extracorporeal support); Weisfeldt & Becker, supra note 216, at 3037 (citing several studies showing an advantage in survival
rates when controlled reperfusion or hypothermia are used).
284. Shemie, supra note 273, at 3. See also Lynn & Cranford, supra note 234, at 109 (recommending a delay of at least ten minutes to avoid potential error in diagnosing death in individuals
undergoing resuscitation).
285. Bracco et al., supra note 230, at 753.
286. DuBois, supra note 150, at 33; see also Veatch, supra note 213, at 197 (suggesting the
question of whether a patient is dead after two minutes of asystole may not be important in uncontrolled donors, but would "raise serious problems" in patients who suffer sudden cardiac arrest).
287.
1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 58. See also Veatch, supra note 213, at 197-198
(recommending periods of pulselessness longer than two minutes to establish irreversibility).
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period between the end of resuscitation and transfer to an organ transplant team may not even be necessary. 288
Finally, it is questionable whether waiting ten minutes or slightly
longer after an absent heartbeat for organ procurement is detrimental to
viability of the organs. One of the oldest DCD programs is at the Hospital Clfnico San Carlos in Madrid, Spain, where most of the non-heartbeating donors are adults who suffer cardiac arrest outside the hospital.2 89
The Madrid criteria include a requirement that the heartbeat must be absent for at least ten minutes after CPR is stopped. 290 Despite this waiting
period, transplantation of kidneys from uncontrolled DCD donors have
long-term outcomes similar to those of organs from brain-dead donors.2 9'
The University of Zurich, another program that has been using kidney
transplants from non-heart-beating donors since the mid-1980s, has also
demonstrated that using a ten minute interval between cardiopulmonary
arrest and organ procurement does not impair long-term graft survival
rates. 292 Waiting slightly longer to recover organs may diminish their
quality but that seems a price most people would be willing to pay to
ensure that they are not prematurely declared dead.
B. Children
Although DCD has been primarily used in adult donors, there are
calls for expanding its use in pediatric populations.293 The need for new
sources of pediatric organs is particularly acute as the number of braindead donors in the pediatric population is decreasing due to improvements in resuscitation and rehabilitation.294 Concerns have been voiced,
however, as to whether the same criteria used in adult DCD should apply
to children.295

288.
2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 152-53.
289. Ana I. Sdnchez-Fructuoso et al., Victims of CardiacArrest Occurring Outside the Hospital: A Source of TransplantableKidneys, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 157, 157 (2006). The clinic
began its DCD program in 1989. Id.
290.
2006 IOM Report, supra note 86, at 139.
291.
Snchez-Fructuoso et al., supra note 289, at 162. Organs other than kidneys may have
poorer results. Id. at 162-63.
292. Markus Weber et al., Kidney Transplantationfrom Donors Without a Heartbeat, 347
NEW ENG. J. MED. 248, 248, 255 (2002). From 1985 until 1995, the hospital initiated organ retrieval
five minutes after cardiac arrest. Beginning in 1995, it instituted a ten minute waiting period. Id. at
249; see also Menikoff, supra note 204, at 162 (citing to studies that indicated a longer waiting
period would not impair the usefulness of organs).
293. See Boucek et al., supra note 9, at 713, 714 (encouraging pediatric heart transplantation
from DCD donors); Amy L. Durall et al., Potentialfor Donation After Cardiac Death in a Children's Hospital, 119 PEDIATRICS 219, 221 (2007) (noting that the experience with DCD in pediatrics
hospitals is "quite small"); Nikoleta S. Kolovos et al., Donation After Cardiac Death in Pediatric
CriticalCare, 8 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 47, 47 (2007) (stating that DCD may increase the
number of pediatric organs for donation).
294. Margaret Ferguson & Jeannie Zuk, Organ Donation After Cardiac Death: A New Trend
in Pediatrics,J. PEDIATRIC GASTROENTEROLOGY & NuTRITION 219, 219 (2003).
295.
The transplantation of hearts from three DCD donors by a team at Denver Children's
Hospital raises questions not only about applying DCD protocols to children, but also whether hearts
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DeVita, one of the leading proponents of DCD, has questioned
whether adult DCD protocols are appropriate for children because child296
Current American
ren may tolerate prolonged circulatory collapse.
297
Heart Association resuscitation guidelines make the same observation.
Others have suggested that the risk of autoresuscitation may be variable

in the pediatric population.2 98 There is also a heightened potential for

conflicts of interest in pediatric DCD. Unlike the adult patient population in which the patient-donor is in a specialty critical care unit treated
by one set of physicians and the potential recipient is at another location
treated by another set of physicians, most potential pediatric donors are
in multidisciplinary units, in which the same team may take care of both
the potential donor and recipient. 299 This arrangement leads to "[t]he
prospect of having to advise one set of parents that they should consider

withdrawal of [life] support because of devastating brain injury while
other patients in the same unit might become recipients of the newly deceased child's organs seems highly troubling to some intensivists.

This situation raises questions about conflicts inherent in terminating
resuscitative efforts in the child donor.30 '
In some children's hospitals, the rush to expand pediatric DCD faces an unenthusiastic clinical staff.3 °2 This may be due to the lack of pediatric DCD programs and the unfamiliarity of staff with this type of
organ donation.30 3 The reluctance of pediatric care providers to embrace

DCD may also reflect wariness in forging ahead on a new form of organ
donation where there are many unanswered questions, including the appropriate time interval between the cessation of cardiac function and
organ recovery. 3° With the mandates of The Joint Commission and
UNOS for all hospitals and transplant centers to develop DCD policies,
its use in pediatric institutions deserves more scrutiny.

can ethically and legally be removed from adult or child DCD donors. See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
296. DeVita et al., supra note 49, at 1712.
297. 2005 American Heart Association Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and
Emergency Cardiovascular, Part 2: Ethical Issues, supra note 253, at IV-7 (noting that intact survival in children after prolonged resuscitation has been documented).
298. See, e.g., Joel E. Frader, Deconstructing Donation After Cardiac Death, 8 PEDIATRIC
CRITICAL CARE MED.76, 77 (2007) (stating that the pediatric community needs to study whether the
risk of autoresuscitation varies with age).
Id.
299.
300. Id.
See Bernat, supra note 14, at 670 (noting that conflicts are more of a concern where the
301.
potential donor is a child).
302. See, e.g., Martha A. Q. Curly, Pediatric Staff Perspectives on Organ Donation After
Cardiac Death in Children, 8 PEDIATRIC CRITICAL CARE MED. 212, 216-18 (2007).
Id.
303.
Id. at 217 (reporting that thirty-eight percent of survey participants favored basing the
304.
determination of death on the absence of brain activity, while sixty percent approved an average
waiting period after cardiac cessation of five minutes and a range of two to ten minutes); see also
Frader, supra note 298, at 77 (calling for further research on DCD in pediatric hospitals).
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V. Is DCD CAUSING THE DEATH OF DONORS?
The most serious criticism of DCD is that the removal of organs after two to five minutes of asystole causes the death of donors and is tantamount to murder. °5 This is a complex issue, particularly with controlled donors who have a constitutionally protected right to withdraw
life-sustaining care. 3° Modem law recognizes the difference between
killing and being allowed to die.30 7 The removal of life support provides
the condition for death; once the heart stops, the body can no longer
supply the means of sustaining life and death through lack of oxygen to
the brain follows. Hastening death by the removal of life support with
the patient's consent is not unlawful.30 8 The question presented by DCD
is whether the act of organ recovery in donors in the minutes before brain
death alters that legal principle.
Menikoff argues that, at least with controlled donors, it is not organ
retrieval that factually causes death; it is the loss of oxygen to the brain
caused by removal of the ventilator. 309 The intervening removal of organs during the process of dying does not affect the timing of brain
death, which is occurring because of lack of blood flow. 310 Since controlled donors will not be resuscitated, it is only a matter of time before
irreversible death occurs, a point that is not hastened by organ procurement."'
Even if organ procurement does not cause death in the controlled
donor, a precept of the dead donor rule is that vital organs cannot be removed before a person is dead.3 12 DCD donors may very well be alive at
the time organs are removed. In controlled donors, this may not be significant because they have chosen to forego life support and likely will
not survive even if organ removal is not performed. For those who suffer
unexpected cardiac arrest and who have not made their end-of-life wishes known, however, the rush to procure organs is worrisome. Recent
305. See Joan McGregor et al., Do Donation After CardiacDeath Protocols Violate Criminal
Homicide Statutes?, 27 MED. & L. 241, 251 (2008) (contending that the removal of organs prior to
brain death may be the proximate cause of death); Michael Potts, Truthfulness in Transplantation:
Non-Heart Beating Organ Donation, 2 PHIL., ETHICS, & HUMAN. IN MED. 1, 2 (2007), available at
http://www.peh-med.comlcontent/2/l/17 (calling for a ban on DCD because the donor is not dead
until the organs are removed); Veatch, supra note 211, at 673 (asserting that removing a heart from a
DCD donor after seventy-five seconds is "ending a life by organ removal").
306.
See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (stating that a competent person's liberty interest in refusing treatment could be inferred from the Court's prior decisions).
307.
See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997) ("This Court has also recognized, at least
implicitly, the distinction between letting a patient die and making that patient die.").
308. Id. at 802-03.
309.
Menikoff, supra note 150, at 162.
310.
Id.
311. Id.; see also James L. Bernat, Are Organ DonorsAfter CardiacDeathReally Dead?, 17 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 122, 127 (2006) (agreeing with Menikoff that organ donation does not hasten
death in controlled donors).
312.
Menikoff, supra note 150, at 162.
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studies indicate that there are many victims of sudden cardiac arrest who,
provided with appropriate therapy, survive after prolonged periods of
cardiac arrest and, therefore, should not be considered dead after only
two to five minutes of absent circulation.1 3 For at least some victims of
sudden cardiac arrest, whether in or out of a hospital, a decision to begin
organ procurement minutes after stopping CPR deprives them of an opportunity to reverse the arrest, which may be considered a hastening or
direct cause of their demise. As the IOM recognized in 1997, prematurely abandoning resuscitation in the uncontrolled donor so that organ recovery can proceed "may forfeit the life of a patient who is otherwise a
salvageable, competent person. 3 14
Also troublesome are the removal of hearts from DCD donors and
their reanimation in recipients. As Veatch has pointed out, how can irreversible cardiac death be diagnosed when the functions of the heart are
later reversed? 3' 5 The use of ECMO to restart circulation in a person
declared dead because of irreversible cessation of circulation raises the
same concern. Although it may be true that in most cases, withdrawal of
life support and the accompanying cessation of breathing and circulation
are the cause of death, this hypothesis does not account for cases in
which circulation is restored after "death." If blood flow is restored
through artificial means shortly after the declaration of cardiac death,
there is a possibility of brain resuscitation.31 6 Thus, it would seem that
surgeons need to postpone organ recovery until brain death Occurs. 317 As
one commentator explains, "If the state of death is reversed, then harvesting organs from the reanimated patient prior to death occurring a
second time is failure to respect the dead donor rule: it constitutes restoring life and killing. 31 8
Absent reanimation of the patient, however, it would be an onerous
task for a prosecutor to bring homicide charges because of the difficulty,
if not impossibility, of proving at what point in the organ procurement
process the dying patient was alive or had reached the point of irreversibility. Patients' clinical conditions vary and so does the speed at which
they die after cardiac arrest. Potential controlled donors who are taken
off life support and who are already severely neurologically compromised may die sooner than those who have not suffered a prior brain

313. See discussion supra Part M.A.
314.
1997 IOM Report, supra note 90, at 49.
315.
Veatch, supra note 211, at 673.
316.
McGregor et al., supra note 305, at 250.
317.
See McGregor et al., supra note 305, at 251 (recommending a waiting time of fifteen to
twenty minutes until brain death).
318.
James M. DuBois, Non-Heart Beating Organ Donation: A Defense of the Required Determinationof Death, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 126, 130 (1999).
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insult.31 9 Controlled and uncontrolled donors who have an intact brain
prior to cardiac arrest may have a more prolonged process of dying.32 °
Although there may be clear-cut cases in which a patient's death is hastened by organ recovery, in most cases, there are probably too many unknowns in locating the precise moment of death that, with the high burden of proof, would negate criminal prosecution of physicians who practice DCD.3 2'
Further, there may not be the sense of public outrage over DCD that
would spur a prosecutor to examine homicide charges.322 Like many
experts, the public may believe that it is acceptable to procure organs
from patients voluntarily removed from life support who may not be
quite dead-after all, they will be dead shortly. Norman Fost suggests
that Americans have little interest in esoteric arguments about life and
death in organ donation, noting that when concerns about DCD in controlled donors were raised by the media, the public was apathetic in its
response.323 A recent study also indicates that many members of the
public may be willing to violate the dead donor rule because they are
confused about the definition of brain death and when organs can legally
be procured from those who suffer devastating neurological injuries.32 4
It is debatable whether the public will be apathetic about the expansion of DCD to victims of sudden cardiac arrest. New York City's plan
for organ recovery ambulances is the first of these initiatives to be aired
by the mainstream media.325 While many individuals may be confused
about the concept of brain death, they no doubt understand what it means
when the heart stops beating. Many are also understandably concerned
about the level of care they will receive in the event of an unexpected
cardiac arrest at home or at work. It is one thing to argue that adults who
consent to the withdrawal of life support be allowed to donate organs
even if we are not quite sure at what point in the process they are potentially alive or irreversibly dead. It is quite another to hastily remove organs from victims of cardiac arrest who expect a thorough resuscitation.
319. See Rady et al., supra note 86, at 327 (recognizing that although donors who have preexisting neurological injuries may not have meaningful brain activity at the time of arrest, the same
may not be true of potential donors who have intact brain function prior to arrest).
320. Id.
321.
The California transplant surgeon who allegedly administered excessive and unnecessary
medication is not being prosecuted for homicide, but for dependent adult abuse and prescribing a
controlled substance without a medical purpose. McKinley, supra note 28, at Al.
322.
See Norman Fost, Reconsidering the Dead Donor Rule: Is It Important that Organ Donors be Dead?, 14 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 249, 255 (2004) (arguing that prosecutors have tolerated "clearly illegal behavior" by physicians in sympathetic cases).
323.
Id. at 254-56.
324.
Laura A. Siinoff et al., Death and Organ Procurement: Public Belief and Attitudes, 14
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 217, 228 (2004) (reporting that ninety-eight percent of study participants
had heard of brain death, but that only one-third believed that brain-dead persons were legally dead.
Of those who considered a brain-dead person alive, over sixty-six percent said they would donate
organs).
325.
Cara Buckley, City To Explore a Way To Add Organ Donors, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008.
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Although most people support organ donation in theory, many are unwilling to become donors or to donate a family member's organs.326 One of
the explanations for this reluctance is the fear of being declared prematurely dead or that emergency care will be compromised.32 7 The question
that must be asked is, under what circumstances will the public be willing to accept a certain level of error in diagnosing death in order to promote organ procurement?
VI. How SHOULD DEATH BE DEFINED IN DCD DONORS?
Recognizing that defining death is not a simple matter, some in the
medical community question whether this is even an important issue.
Under the title, "Philosophical Debates About the Definition of Death:
Who Cares?," Stuart J. Youngner and Robert M. Arnold argue that the
concept of irreversibility is impossibly muddled and that the conversation should turn instead to whether it is permissible to take organs from
patients who are "beyond harm," but who may not be dead. 328 Robert D.
Truog, a prominent bioethicist, has long argued that the dead donor rule
should be abandoned and that people whom we consider alive, but who
are terminally ill or permanently unconscious, should be allowed to donate organs while still alive, because the harm inflicted on these patients
is minimal. 329 For example, a person in a persistent vegetative state
(PVS), who is not legally dead, 330 should be allowed the pre-mortem
opportunity to donate her organs. For these people, the quality of life is
so unacceptable or death is so imminent that, with their consent, we ethically can take their organs before they die. 33 1 Similarly, other notable
medical ethicists, including Fost, assert that the very premise on which
we remove vital organs-death of the donor-is scientifically flawed, so
that certain patients should have the right to donate organs even if it
means a premature death.332
Others contend that we should not abandon the dead donor rule but
rather allow individuals the choice of defining the conditions in which
they could be considered dead so as to allow the removal of organs.
Veatch has argued for over three decades that brain death should include
326.
See Laura A. Siminoff et al., Factors Influencing Families' Consentfor Donation of Solid
Organsfor Transplantation,286 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 71,71 (2001) (citing studies showing that while
more than seventy-five percent of people said they would donate their organs if asked, less than half
of families actually agreed to donation after death).
327. See DuBois, supra note 318, at 132 (citing surveys showing that significant numbers of
people fear their health care will be compromised if they agree to be organ donors).
328. Youngner & Arnold, supra note 252, at 533.
329. Robert D. Truog, Brain Death-Too Flawed to Endure, Too Ingrained to Abandon, 35
J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 273,278 (2007).
330. A person in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) is not brain dead under the UDDA because
the person has not suffered whole brain death; PVS patients have brain stem functions. See Cruzan
v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 n.1 (describing the physiological state of Nancy
Cruzan, who was in a PVS).
Truog, supra note 329, at 278.
331.
332. Fost, supranote 322, at 250-51.
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not only those who have complete loss of brain functions including the
brain stem, but also those who have lost only higher brain or cerebral
activity. 333 According to Veatch, those who are no longer "members in
full standing of the moral community" (such as those in PVS) should be
able, at their option, to be defined as dead so that organs could be legally
taken without violating the dead donor rule.334
The UDDA, UAGA, and most state laws defining death stand in the
way of proposals to abandon the dead donor rule or except certain groups
from its confines. Under the UAGA, one needs to be deceased to be a
donor, and the UDDA defines brain death as death of the whole brain,
including the brain stem. 335 Homicide laws also prohibit intentionally
causing death through the removal of vital organs.336 There have been no
serious attempts to change the legal definition of death and it is to be
expected that the public, courts, and legislators may balk at allowing
337
physicians to remove organs from the living (as presently defined).
Others who have expressed unreserved support for the dead donor
rule in removing organs from brain-dead donors struggle with its application in the DCD context. Despite his early criticism of the Pittsburg Protocol for allowing organ recovery in patients who were not dead, 338 Bernat now concludes that it is irrelevant whether DCD violates the dead
donor rule. 3 39 He acknowledges that by using the true meaning of irreversible, i.e. that a patient can not be successfully resuscitated, some
DCD donors may not be dead. 340 To avoid the problem of removing
organs from one who is not irreversibly dead, he advocates substituting
the word "permanent" for "irreversible" in describing the loss of circulatory functions in DCD donors.3 4' Permanent in this context means that
functions will not be restored, either spontaneously by the patient or
through artificial resuscitation.342 Bernat does not advocate changing the
UDDA to reflect this change in terminology, however, because he believes that most physicians are already using the permanence standard in
practice.34 3 He candidly recognizes that using permanent loss of func333.
Robert M. Veatch, The DeadDonor Rule: True by Definition, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 10, 1011(2003).
334.
Robert M. Veatch, Abandon the Dead Donor Rule or Change the Definition of Death, 14
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 261, 269 (2004).

335.
A number of states also codify the dead donor rule. See supra note 152.
336.
Truog recognizes the legal difficulty in abandoning the dead donor rule, as it would mean
that organ recovery is the cause of a patient's death. He counters that the transplant physician's
actions could be ethically regarded as not constituting a homicide. Truog, supra note 329, at 279.
337. See In re T.A.C.P., 609 So. 2d 588, 592 (Fla. 1992) (refusing to declare an anencephalic
infant dead for purposes of organ transplantation).
338.
Bemat, supra note 164, at 20 (stating that at the time organs are procured under the Pittsburgh protocol, "death has not yet occurred").
339. Bemat, supra note 311, at 128-29.
340. Id. at 125, 128.
341.
Id. at 124-25.
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Id. at 124.
343.
Id. at 127.
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tions as the test for death in DCD donors may transgress the dead donor
rule, but argues that this exception is justified because the patient soon
will be dead and the outcome is the same whether using a permanence or
irreversibility standard. 344
For Truog, Bernat's recommendation for a change in terminology
confirms the obsolete nature of the dead donor rule. 345 He views Bernat's proposal as an implicit acknowledgment that patients under a DCD
protocol are not dead.34 6 By acknowledging the fact that DCD donors
may be alive, Truog contends the transplant community has already
crossed the boundary of the dead donor rule and should be honest and
abolish it, both as to brain death and cardiac death. 347 Similarly, Joseph
L. Verheijde and colleagues, who have been vociferous critics of DCD
because it violates the dead donor rule, support efforts to eliminate the
dead donor rule as long as patients and their families give meaningful
informed consent to the removal of organs before death.348
There may be legitimate reasons for reconstructing the definition of
death as it applies to organ donation after cardiac death. From a purely
utilitarian view, increasing the supply of organs is a social good. Particularly, in cases of planned withdrawal from life support-where the patient or surrogate has chosen not to resuscitate-it may be morally defensible to declare death within a short period of time in order to facilitate organ retrieval. Again, a comparison of patients in an ICU is illustrative of this principle.349 Patient A wishes to withdraw life support and
to donate organs. B, also a patient in the ICU, declines CPR, but does not
wish to be an organ donor. B has a cardiac arrest but is not resuscitated.
At what point is B irreversibly dead? The answer is that, in most cases,
the exact time of death does not matter because no surgical intervention,
such as organ procurement, is to be immediately performed on the
body.35° Patient B could be declared dead at the time of asystole. But it
is also likely that a physician will not rush to declare B dead and that
some delay will occur before B is transported to the morgue. Just like A,
B will be "allowed to die," but precisely when B becomes irreversibly

344.
Id. at 128-29. Ten years ago, Bernat took a much different position: "Accepting a circulatory formulation for death immediately throws into jeopardy the entire multiorgan transplantation
program unless the dead donor rule is sacrificed." Bemat, supra note 164, at 22.
345.
Robert D. Truog & Thomas I. Cochrane, The Truth About "Donation After Cardiac
Death," 17 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 133, 136 (2006).

346.
Id. at 133, 136 (stating that DCD is a misnomer because donors are "dying but not yet
dead").
347.
Id. at 136.
348.
Verheijde et al., supra note 236, at 7.
349.
This scenario is also adapted from a similar hypothetical described in Youngner et al.,
supra note 158, at 17.
350.
The time of a non-donor's death could be of legal significance under some circumstances,
however, such as whether a person survived another under the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act.
UNIF. SWIULTANEOUS DEATH AcT §§ 2-4 (1993), 8B U.L.A. 147 (2001).
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dead is generally of little moral or legal consequence.3 5' Some have argued that if B can be considered dead when cardiopulmonary functions
cease, why should we not consider A, the controlled donor, dead at the
same moment? 352 Both A and B are patients in whom we cannot clearly
define the line between life and death, and locating the moment of irreversible death is more of a moral decision than a legal one. Defining
irreversibility to mean that the heart will not be started in controlled DCD
at least fulfills the patient's wishes to end life-sustaining care and to become an organ donor. As John Robertson argued:
Not to regard her then as dead because she might have been resuscitated in a situation in which she never will be resuscitated is counterintuitive to common understandings of death held by the general
public, families, health care providers, and
most ethicists, philoso353
phers, and lawyers who study these issues.
There may be limits, however, to how far the transplant community
can legally or ethically venture in controlled DCD. Even some supporters of DCD draw the line at calling death in less than two minutes and
do not support transplanting hearts from DCD donors, a practice which
seems on its face to squarely contradict any notion of the irreversibility
of circulatory functions.354 But accepting some restrictions, preferably
set in place by legislators along with medical experts, DCD in adult controlled donors could proceed.
Nonetheless, this resolution of the debate also means that, with
DCD, death will be defined not by an irreversible physiological state but
by the context it which it occurs. If we redefine irreversibility in order to
retrieve viable organs from controlled donors, where will our "gerrymandering" 355 of death criteria end? Truog argues that if DCD is ethically acceptable even if donors are not quite dead, it should be permissible
for other consenting terminally ill or neurologically devastated patients
to donate their organs under general anesthesia before death.356 After all,
it is certain that they, too, will soon be dead and their organs will be

351.
See Jerry Menikoff, The Importance Of Being Dead: Non-Heart-Beating Organ, 18
IssuEs L. & MED. 3, 6 (2002) (stating that until physicians wanted to remove organs from non-heartbeating donors, there was no rush to declare death and a person could be pronounced dead as long as
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Robertson, supra note 200, at 12.
354.

See Bemat, supra note 14, at 671(stating that recovering hearts from DCD donors and

determining death seventy-five seconds after heart stoppage exceed the boundaries of DCD);
Veatch, supra note 211, at 673 (contending that the removal of hearts from DCD donors is the cause

of death).
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Arnold & Youngner, supra note 151, at 222 (arguing that the concept of brain death was

an effort to "gerrymander" the definition of death to increase the donor pool).
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20091

REDEFINING WHO IS LEGALLY DEAD

more useful if recovered before death.357 Ultimately, "For better 3 or
58 for
worse, the bright line [between life and death] is growing dimmer.
With controlled donors, we can say their intent is to have life support removed, to die, and to donate their organs. The public may not
care whether these patients are declared dead a little early in the dying
process. 359 But this reasoning cannot seamlessly be applied to uncontrolled donors. We can not easily determine the wishes of those in sudden or unexpected cardiac arrest. In most cases, these patients want to be
resuscitated and to live. To begin the organ procurement process only a
few minutes (or seconds) after "unsuccessful" resuscitation in victims of
sudden cardiac arrest seems to give insufficient respect to their personal
autonomy and to jeopardize their small, but increasing, chance of survival.
Under the protocol being considered in New York City, emergency
responders will call the time of death when further resuscitative efforts
are deemed futile.36 ° With the organ recovery ambulance hovering nearby, there is a risk that some people will fear that they will be abandoned
too soon. Such suspicions may not always be justified, but they are understandable and can undermine confidence in the transplantation system. We should proceed cautiously if DCD is to be expanded to this
population so that organs will not be361inadvertently removed from those
few who may still be "slightly alive."
There are several possible solutions to this debate. The first, and
most preferable, option is to alter death statutes to define irreversibility in
patients voluntarily withdrawing life support (who are not brain dead) as
the time of cessation of circulatory functions plus a period that scientific
studies demonstrate would exclude the possibility of self-resuscitation.
This definition would affect not only organ donors; death would have the
same meaning for all who electively withdraw life-sustaining measures.
Part of the dilemma over the meaning of irreversibility is that the UDDA
and many state death statutes were enacted before patients had a legal
right to choose whether to be kept alive through extraordinary medical
treatment. In promoting a standard of irreversibility that requires an inability to resuscitate, the UDDA fails to recognize that many deaths in
hospitals today are from a planned withdrawal of life support in patients
who refuse further resuscitation. Thus, defining death in this population
to mean the cessation of cardiopulmonary functions plus a waiting period
to exclude self-resuscitation acknowledges both legal approval and social
357. Truog, supra note 345, at 134.
358.
Arnold & Youngner, supra note 151, at 224.
359. Bernat, supra note 311, at 129.
360.
See Buckley, supra note 2.
361.
See, e.g., William J. Burke, More Donors Could be Survivors, ST. LOuis REV. ONLINE,
June 13, 2003, http://www.stlouisreview.comL/article.php?id=4179 (asserting that DCD deprives
some donors of a chance at survival and calling for a halt to the practice in Catholic hospitals).
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acceptance of the "right to die." Along with this statutory recognition,
the medical community must come to a common understanding and clear
criteria about how long an interval is necessary to rule out the possibility
of autoresuscitation. The idea that, after two minutes (or seventy-five
seconds), one can be considered dead in one hospital but alive in another
is inexcusable.
Although a delay of only a few minutes from arrest to declaration of
death in patients for whom there will be no resuscitative efforts may be
acceptable, that short an interval is not tolerable in individuals undergoing CPR. Irreversibility in its common sense notion-that functions
cannot be reversed-should be retained for all other individuals, a standard that takes into account the great strides in resuscitation being made
today and that provides a measure of safety from an erroneous diagnosis
of death.
The second option is to wait at least ten minutes or longer to declare
death in all DCD donors to make sure that any attempt at resuscitation
would fail, i.e. we can not reverse because the brain is irreversibly damaged.362 The transplant community has resisted this construal of irreversibility because of concerns about how longer waiting times can affect
organ viability. Yet studies over the last two decades tend to demonstrate that a ten-minute waiting time does not impair long-term survival
rates in recipients of kidneys, the organs most in demand. The primary
drawback to this proposal is using a fixed period of time to determine
irreversibility in the uncontrolled donor. With victims of sudden cardiac
arrest, the prevailing view has been that after ten to fifteen minutes of
pulselessness, irreversible brain damage inevitably follows. As discussed previously, recent studies have demonstrated that with innovative
resuscitative therapies, some patients can survive prolonged periods of
cardiac arrest, with little neurological sequelae. The period of time from
arrest to organ procurement should, therefore, vary according to current
medical knowledge and technology. Appointing a fixed hands-off waiting period to uncontrolled donors may deny future victims a possible
chance of survival.
The third solution is to do nothing. DuBois argues that the meaning
of irreversibility should remain vague and left to physicians to define
depending on the context. 363 The do-nothing solution may preserve the
status quo in controlled donors, but in light of the apparent expansion of
DCD to uncontrolled donors, to children, and to heart transplants, public
engagement on this question is inevitable. There are cutting edge issues
associated with DCD that have received little attention. Protocols acceptable in the adult population may not transfer in toto to child DCD
362.
Menikoff, supra note 204, at 162 (suggesting that a ten to fifteen minute wait might be
appropriate).
363.
DuBois, supra note 318, at 127.
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donors. Recovering hearts and reanimating them in the recipient or using
ECMO or other techniques to restore circulation and possibly resuscitate
the brain seem to transgress the "prudent boundaries" of DCD.36 These
are practices that should not be pursued until such time as they have been
fully examined and approved by both the medical community and policymakers.
CONCLUSION

The focus of organ transplantation has been almost exclusively on
the welfare of the recipient of organs rather than the donor. Perhaps that
is as it should be; medicine needs to concentrate on the living rather than
on the dying. Denton Cooley, one of the pioneers of heart transplantation, stated: "We should not jeopardize the possible survival of the recipient while we are waiting around to make a decision whether the cadaver, as you call it, is dead or not., 365 Pragmatism, however, can only go so
far before basic legal and ethical principles are compromised, and it is
worthwhile to ask if we should redefine who is dead in order to salvage
their organs.
Donation after cardiac death from controlled donors has been proceeding with little public or legislative discussion of whether these patients meet the legal criteria for death. In our incessant demand for organs, we have glossed over difficult questions: what does it mean to be
dead, and is death, however defined, a necessary condition for organ
donation? There is a need to air the debate over DCD in the public arena
before it is extended to other situations that present new legal and ethical
challenges. Otherwise, what seems controversial today, for example,
removing hearts from infants seventy-five seconds after arrest and reanimating them in other children, may become routine and acceptable
tomorrow.
Some argue this is an academic controversy that will not spark any
public interest or concern among lawmakers.366 Others are worried that
if the public is alerted to the debate about the uncertainty of death, its
willingness to donate organs will diminish.367 Yet this is a public policy
issue that should not be decided by the medical community alone.368 The
organ transplant system depends on civic participation, and the dispute
over whether organs should be taken from some patients before death
deserves discussion beyond the pages of scholarly journals. As DCD
Bernat, supra note 14, at 671.
LOCK, supra note 210, at 87-88.
See, e.g., Fost, supra note 322, at 254-56.
See Robert A. Burt, Where Do We Go From Here?, in THE DEFINITION OF DEATH:
CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES, supra note 207, at 332, 333 (arguing that legislative changes may
provoke public distrust of organ donation).
368. See Menikoff, supra note 35 1, at 20 (contending that the debate over the definition of
death should not be sidestepped as it squarely addresses the kind of protections we are willing to
give people in our society).
364.
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moves from consenting patients in hospitals to unexpected victims in the
streets, the public needs to be reassured that the medical community will
not further manipulate the blurred line between life and death.
The disquiet over DCD may be rendered moot by the inevitable
progress of science. Through xenotransplantation or the growing of organs from stem cells, we may someday be able to look to alternative
sources of transplantable organs. Until that happens,
the only source of
3 69
organs is from humans-wanted, dead or alive.

369.
"Wanted, dead or alive" is a common phrase from the Old West, but it was also used in
the title of an article about the UDDA. Goldsmith, supra note 56, at 871.

